





Abstract. The theory of branching space-times, put forward by Belnap (Synthese 92,
1992), considers indeterminism as local in space and time. In the axiomatic foundations of
that theory, so-called choice points mark the points at which the (local) possible future can
turn out in different ways. Working under the assumption of choice points is suitable for
many applications, but has an unwelcome topological consequence that makes it difficult
to employ branching space-times to represent a range of possible physical space-times.
Therefore it is interesting to develop a branching space-times theory without choice points.
This is what we set out to do in this paper, providing new foundations for branching space-
times in terms of choice sets rather than choice points. After motivating and developing the
resulting theory in formal detail, we show that it is possible to translate structures of one
style into structures of the other style and vice versa. This result shows that the underlying
idea of indeterminism as the branching of spatio-temporal histories is robust with respect
to different implementations, making a choice between them a matter of expediency rather
than of principle.
Keywords: Indeterminism, Branching histories, Choice points, Topology, Local Euclidic-
ity, Hausdorff property.
1. Motivating a Formal Theory of Indeterminism in Space-Time
The theory of branching space-times (henceforth BST) considers local inde-
terminism in space and time. Indeterminism is the thesis that a system has
more than one alternative possible future evolution. In BST, the emphasis
is on the divergence of alternative evolutions occurring in small regions of
space and time that can be idealized to be just point events. From the per-
spective of BST as put forward by Belnap [1], which we will denote BST92,
indeterminateness gives way to determinateness at point events.
A focus on local aspects of indeterminism is by no means peculiar to the
BST92 analysis of indeterminism. It is quite typical for questions of where
and when to come up in indeterministic contexts. We ask, for instance, where
and when a person decided on a particular course of action. Or, in a science-
related context, we may wonder at which location, and from which instant
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on, it has been determined that an electron passing a Stern-Gerlach device
would be deflected in a given direction. The naturalness of such questions
indicates, we believe, that an adequate analysis of indeterminism needs to
pay attention to local details of indeterminism: where, when, and how alter-
native evolutions diverge. These questions are pressing, no matter whether
one prefers to analyze indeterminism in terms of branching possible histo-
ries, like in BST92, or in terms of non-overlapping segment-wise isomorphic
possible scenarios of the Lewis tradition.
The question of what the branching of possible histories looks like at
the local level is difficult to answer. BST92, being a rigorous axiomatic the-
ory, decides the question of how branching occurs via one of its axioms: in
BST92, the overlap of two possible histories always has a maximal element.
The opposite option would be for the difference of two histories to always
have a minimal element. Which option is right? Or maybe this cannot be de-
cided, or an answer to the question can be avoided altogether? The present
paper shows how to avoid taking sides, in the following sense. First, we
present a number of theorems that show that the second option mentioned,
branching of histories without maximal elements, can be worked out in a
formally precise way.1 Second, we show that there is a systematic way of
translating branching structures of one kind into branching structures of
the other kind. In this sense, we can leave it open what branching is really
like. For both steps, the notion of a transition structure, which represents
local indeterminism, is crucial.2
A key motivation for working out an ecumenical position is that we do
not want to press any global argument for preferring one of the two options
mentioned above. We acknowledge that there are valid reasons in favor of
both. In the original paper developing BST92 [1], the decision in favor of
maxima in the intersection of histories is commented as follows:
Finally, let me explicitly note that on the present theory [. . . ],
a causal origin has always ‘a last point of indeterminateness’ (the
choice point) and never ‘a first point of determinateness’. I find the
matter puzzling since it’s neither clear to me how an alternate theory
would work nor clear what difference it makes. [1, 428]
1Technically, we offer a way of replacing the prior choice principle PCP92 of Belnap [1],
Definition 6, with a new version, PCPNF, via Definition 18.
2Transition structures figure prominently in the work of Rumberg [19,20]; see also
Rumberg and Zanardo [21]. These works focus mainly on semantics and proof theory,
and they consider transitions in the simpler framework of so-called branching time, not
branching space-times.
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This feeling of puzzlement also stands behind some objections to BST92: the
objectors ask what the reasons are for assuming one pattern of branching,
or they are skeptical whether that pattern is compatible with the physics of
space-time.3 Thus, it seems prudent not to decide the matter of patterns of
branching by fiat, at least not in advance of some further considerations of
theoretical physics.
A second motivation for this paper stems from topological consequences
of preferring one option over the other, and relates to topological require-
ments standardly imposed on the mathematical structures used in physics
for representing space-times, so-called differential manifolds. In this con-
text, it is perhaps worth observing that BST92 is not meant to be a theory
of physics, for two reasons. On the one hand, its axioms are too frugal to be
specific enough for a direct application in physics. On the other hand, BST92
explores the combination of space-time and modality, and that combination
does not fall into the standard repertoire of physics. Thus, general relativity
represents the evolution of single space-times, whereas branching structures
aim to accommodate multiple alternative space-times. In BST92 one should
thus not expect to find the same representational mathematical structures
as in physics, since these structures represent different aspects of spatio-
temporal reality. But of course, some way of combining these endeavors is
desirable.
Now, a differential manifold used in physics to represent a space-time
has two properties that are hard to satisfy in branching structures. First, by
definition, a differential manifold is locally Euclidean, which means that each
point of the manifold has a neighborhood that can be mapped continuously
onto an open subset of Rn (in realistic applications n = 4; see Section 3.2 for
the definition). In this way, points in the manifold can be assigned spatio-
temporal coordinates via so-called charts. A BST92 structure, however, is
not locally Euclidean with respect to its natural topology (barring trivial
one-history cases). The reason is that a neighborhood of a maximal element
in the intersection of two histories cannot be appropriately mapped onto Rn.
We thus face a problem when trying to assign spatio-temporal coordinates
to the elements of a BST92 structure. To address this problem, we will
develop a version of BST without maximal elements in the intersection of
histories. The natural topology on such structures stands a chance of being
locally Euclidean. We are also interested in finding an operation that would
3See, e.g., Earman [6]. Jeremy Butterfield asked about reasons to assume non-Hausdorff
branching and its compatibility with space-time physics already in 2001 (Butterfield, per-
sonal communication).
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transform BST92 structures into structures that are more friendly to local
Euclidicity.
The second property that differential manifolds in space-time physics
satisfy, but which is typically violated by BST92 structures, is a topological
separation property known as the Hausdorff property (see again Section 3.2).
We will not enforce this feature: the branching structures we develop still
violate the Hausdorff property. We will argue, however, that this violation
is innocuous, as each separate possible history is Hausdorff in its natural
topology. In the same spirit, a manifold representing a single space time of
general relativity is Hausdorff. Since we aim at enabling both the assign-
ment of coordinates to events and the representation of alternative spatio-
temporal histories, the combination of local Euclidicity and the violation of
Hausdorffness on the whole structure seems to be the best result that one
can aim to achieve.4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the extant the-
ory of BST92 in formal detail. We comment on topological issues in Section 3.
In Section 4, we introduce the “new foundations” BST theory, BSTNF. In
Section 5 we show how the two frameworks are linked, and we prove general
translatability results both ways. We conclude in Section 6.
2. What is Out There: The Formal Framework of BST92
Branching space-times theories have been developed in a number of writings
starting with Belnap [1]. The dominant theory that has emerged, BST92,
demands that histories branch at choice points, in the following way: any two
histories overlap, and their overlap contains at least one maximal element.
That decision has the problematic topological consequence mentioned above,
which will be avoided by the novel BST theory to be developed in this
paper. There is a substantial common core of the two theories, which we
present in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2 we provide some general facts about
common BST structures. In Section 2.3 we go on to describe the branching
of histories in general terms, and in Section 2.4 we give a formal definition
of BST92, including its prior choice postulate that demands the existence of
choice points.
4Technically, we are after branching structures that give rise to generalized differential
manifolds, where maximal Hausdorff sub-manifolds can be identified with possible histories
representing single space-times. In this paper, we are only concerned with the topological
structure, deferring a discussion of the differential structure to a separate companion paper.
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2.1. The Core Theory of Branching Space-Times
In this section we describe the formal core of common BST structures (Defi-
nition 2), which is shared by both the established theory of BST92 and by the
“new foundations” theory, BSTNF, that we are motivating and discussing
in this paper.5 Both theories are spelled out in terms of partial orderings,
so we provide some pertinent general notions first.
Definition 1. (Partial order, chain, directed set) A pair 〈W, <〉 is a strict
partial ordering iff < is a relation on the set W that is antisymmetric (∀x, y ∈
W [x < y → y < x]) and transitive (∀x, y, z ∈ W [(x < y ∧y < z) → x < z]).
Note that < is thereby irreflexive (∀x ∈ W [x < x]). We use the companion
notation  in the standard way, i.e., e  e′ iff (e < e′ ∨ e = e′). We
extend the ordering notation to sets, with the universal reading, that is: for
E, F ⊆ W and e ∈ W , we write E  e iff ∀x ∈ E [x  e], we write e  F iff
∀y ∈ F [e  y], and we write E  F iff ∀y ∈ F [E  y].
A set l ⊆ W is a chain iff any two of its members are comparable, i.e.,
for any x, y ∈ l, either x  y or y < x. A set D ⊆ W is (upward) directed
iff it contains a common upper bound for any two of its members, i.e., D is
directed iff for any x, y ∈ D there is z ∈ D s.t. x  z and y  z.
Definition 2. (Common BST structure) A common BST structure is a
pair 〈W, <〉 that fulfills the following conditions:
1. W is a non-empty set of possible point events.
2. < is a strict partial ordering (Definition 1) denoting precedence on W .
A set h ⊆ W is a history iff h is maximal w.r.t. to the property of being
directed. We write Hist(W ) for the set of all histories in 〈W, <〉 (omitting
“(W )” if the reference is clear), and for E ⊆ W , we write H[E] for the
set of those histories containing the whole of E, i.e.: H[E] =df {h ∈ Hist |
E ⊆ h}. We abbreviate H[{e}] as He, i.e., He =df {h ∈ Hist | e ∈ h}.
3. W contains no maximal elements: ∀x ∈ W ∃y ∈ W [x < y]. Also, W
contains no minima elements: ∀x ∈ W ∃y ∈ W [y < x].
4. The ordering < is dense: ∀x, y ∈ W [x < y → ∃z ∈ W [x < z < y]].
5. The ordering contains infima for all lower bounded chains: If l ⊆ W is
a chain that has a lower bound (for some e ∈ W , e  l), then l has a
unique greatest lower bound inf l, which satisfies ∀x [x  l → x  inf l.
5The common structures of Definition 2 contain one axiom that was not part of the
original formal definitions; see note 9 below for details. Published discussions of BST
structures also differ with respect to the permissibility of maximal and/or minimal elements
in these structures. In this paper, for simplicity’s sake, we exclude maxima and minima.
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6. The ordering contains history-relative suprema for all upper bounded
chains: If l ⊆ W is a chain with an upper bound (for some e ∈ W , l  e),
and h ∈ Hist is a history for which l ⊆ h, then l has a unique smallest
upper bound suph l in h:
∀x [(x ∈ h ∧ l  x) → sup
h
l  x].
7. Weiner’s postulate: Let l, l′ ⊆ h1∩h2 be upper bounded chains in histories










8. Historical connection: Any two histories intersect non-emptily, i.e., for h1,
h2 ∈ Hist, we have h1 ∩ h2 = ∅.
From this list, items 1–6 are motivated by the demand that BST structures
be continuous orderings such as employed in space-time theories. Item 7
arises as a technical requirement ruling out unintended ordering structures.
Item 8, on the other hand, is philosophically motivated by taking indeter-
minism to be a feature of Our World.
2.2. Some Facts About Common BST Structures: Histories and Chains
If our world is indeterministic, then not everything that can happen at all,
can happen together—some sets of events are compatible, but others are
not. For example, it is possible that it rains in Pittsburgh next week, and
it is possible that it rains in Kraków next week, and indeed it is possible
that next week, it rains both in Pittsburgh and in Kraków. On the other
hand, it is possible that the coin I am about to toss comes up heads, and
it is possible that it comes up tails, but it is not possible that it comes up
heads and comes up tails. These events are incompatible, or inconsistent.
In BST theory, the notion of compatibility is expressed via the definition
of a history: histories are maximal sets of compatible events.6 Formally, as
stated in Definition 2(2), a history is a maximal directed set, i.e., a set h
maximal w.r.t. the property that for any two events x, y ∈ h, there is some
event z ∈ h such that x and y lie in the past of z. A useful motivation for
6In some related literature, histories are called “chronicles”; see, e.g., Jacobsen et al.
[7]. We stick with the well-established terminology of “history”. It is important not to
confuse a history in the technical sense of BST theory (a maximal consistent set of events)
with the everyday notion of the history of a given event. The latter use is always relational,
whereas the BST use is non-relational.
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this definition of a history is in terms of the consistency of the past: if there
is some possible event z from the perspective of which both x and y have
already happened, then x and y are consistent.
Here are some useful facts about histories in common BST structures:
Fact 1. (Facts about histories) Let h, h1, h2 ∈ Hist and let e, e′ ∈ W . (1)
Histories are closed downward: If e ∈ h and e′ < e, then e′ ∈ h. Thus, if
e′ < e, we have He ⊆ He′ . (2) The complement of a history is closed upward:
If e ∈ h and e < e′, then e′ ∈ h. (3) No history can be a proper subset of
another history: If h1 ⊆ h2, then h1 = h2. (4) Any chain is part of some
history. In particular, for any e ∈ W , He = ∅. (5) As W contains no maximal
elements, no history h contains a maximal element either.
Proof. (1, 2) By maximal directedness. (3) By maximality. (4) Chains are
directed, and thus can be extended using the Zorn-Kuratowski lemma. Note
that singletons are also chains. (5) For reductio, let e be a maximal element
of history h. Then e is the unique maximal element of h. Otherwise there
would be e′ ∈ h incomparable with e and an upper bound e′′ ∈ h for e and
e′, with e < e′′, so e would not be maximal in h. But then as e is the unique
maximal element of h and there is some e′ ∈ W for which e < e′ (as W
contains no maximal elements), the set h ∪ {e′} is also directed (e′, being
the maximum, is a common upper bound for any two elements). Thus h is
not maximal directed, i.e., not a history, contrary to our assumption.
As history-relative suprema of chains will play a crucial role in this paper,
we provide a number of pertinent definitions and facts.
Definition 3. (Chains and related sets) We define the following classes of
chains and related sets:
• Ce: the set of chains ending in, but not containing, e. That is:
l ∈ Ce iff l is an upper bounded chain and there is some h ∈ Hist for
which l ⊆ h and suph l = e, but e ∈ l.
• S (l): the set of all history-relative suprema for an upper bounded chain
l:
S (l) =df {s ∈ W | ∃h ∈ Hist [l ⊆ h ∧ s = sup
h
l]}.
• Pe: the proper past of e:
Pe =df {e′ ∈ W | e′ < e}.
We establish the following Facts, using the existence of history-relative
suprema and the Weiner postulate:
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Fact 2. Let l ⊆ h, and let s = suph′ l for some h′ ∈ Hist with l ⊆ h′. If we
have s ∈ h, then suph l = s.
Proof. Assume that s ∈ h. Observe that s ∈ h′, and that {s} is a (trivial)
chain with suph∗{s} = s for any h∗ ∈ Hs. We can use the Weiner postulate
on the chains l and {s}. As suph′{s} = s = suph′ l, we also have to have
suph l = suph{s} = s.
Fact 3. Let l be an upper bounded chain and h1, h2 ∈ H[l], and let
sup
h1
l = s1 = s2 = sup
h2
l.
Then there is no history h ⊇ {s1, s2}.
Proof. Assume otherwise, and let h ⊇ {s1, s2} for some h ∈ Hist. We have
l ⊆ h, since s1 ∈ h and l  s1. By Fact 2, we have both suph l = s1 (as
s1 ∈ h) and suph l = s2 (as s2 ∈ h). So, contrary to our assumption, s1 = s2.
Here is another useful fact about suprema of chains: If you remove the
endpoint of a maximal upper bounded chain, the history-relative supremum
does not change. The same holds for infima.
Fact 4. Suprema and infima of maximal chains are unaffected by removing
the supremum or infimum: (1) Let l be a maximal upper bounded chain,
and let h ∈ Hist s.t. l ⊆ h. Let s =df suph l. Then for l′ =df l \ {s}, we
also have suph l′ = s. (2) Let l be a maximal lower bounded chain, and let
e =df inf l. Then for l′ =df l \ {e}, we also have inf l′ = e.
Proof. (1) If s ∈ l, we have l′ = l, and there is nothing to prove. Otherwise,
let s′ =df suph l′. Clearly, l′  s, so s′  s (by the definition of suprema).
Now assume for reductio that s = s′, i.e., s′ < s. By the construction of l′,
we then have (*) ∀x ∈ l [x = s → x  s′]. By density, there is some e ∈ W
for which s′ < e < s. By (*), we have e ∈ l. But then, again by (*), we
have that l∗ =df l ∪ {e} is also a chain with suph l∗ = s, and l∗  l. This
contradicts the maximality of l. So, we have s = s′.
The proof for (2) is exactly parallel to that for (1).
The next Fact shows that the proper past of an event e consists of all the
chains ending in, but not containing, e.
Fact 5. For e ∈ W , we have Pe = ∪l∈Ce l.
Proof. “⇐” Let x ∈ ∪l∈Ce l, i.e., x ∈ l for some l ∈ Ce, and let h ∈ He. As
suph l = e and e ∈ l, we have l < e, and thus, x < e, i.e., x ∈ Pe.
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“⇒” Let x ∈ Pe, i.e., x < e. Then {x, e} is a chain, which by the Zorn-
Kuratowski lemma can be extended to a maximal chain l ending in e. Let
h ∈ He; we have suph l = e. By Fact 4, for l′ =df l \ {e} we also have
suph l′ = e, whereby we have some l′ ∈ Ce for which x ∈ l′.
2.3. Indeterminism as the Branching of Histories
If a common BST structure contains just one history, then it is trivial from
the point of view of indeterminism: all events are compatible, and the pic-
ture of a world with just one history is the picture of a deterministic world.
Since there are multiple histories in any non-trivial BST structure, there
are different ways in which these histories can interrelate. A strong intuitive
principle is historical connection (Definition 2(8)): The idea is that any two
histories should share some common past. In this way, any common BST
structure fulfills Lewis’s condition of qualifying as “a world”, since it is con-
nected by a “suitable external relation”, namely, the relation of precedence,
< (see [8], 208).
We will later see that historical connection is implied by stronger prin-
ciples about the interrelation of histories. These so-called prior choice prin-
ciples (Definitions 6 and 18) make specific demands on the way in which
histories branch off one from another. The key decision is what the branch-
ing of histories looks like locally: what are the objects at which histories
branch? BST92 decides for points: histories branch, or remain undivided,
at points. With a view to the formal definition of this type of branching
in Section 2.4 below, we first provide some essential definitions. We start
with the notion of undividedness. Let two histories h1, h2 share some event
e ∈ h1 ∩ h2. Then they also may or may not share a later event. In the
former case, we call the histories undivided at e:
Definition 4. (Undividedness) Let h1, h2 ∈ Hist, and let e ∈ h1 ∩ h2. We
say that h1 and h2 are undivided at e (h1 ≡e h2) iff there is some e′ ∈ h1∩h2
for which e < e′.
For any event e, the relation ≡e among the set He of histories contain-
ing e is obviously symmetrical and reflexive, by the form of the definition.
We will discuss the issue of transitivity in more detail later on. Our way of
enforcing historical connection via prior choice principles will ensure tran-
sitivity. Given transitivity, ≡e is an equivalence relation on He. We use the
notation Πe to indicate the partition of histories from He into equivalence
classes according to ≡e, i.e.,
for H ⊆ He with H = ∅, we have H ∈ Πe ↔ ∀h1, h2 ∈ H [h1 ≡e h2].
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It may be that in fact all histories from He are undivided at e, i.e., e is not
maximal in the intersection of any two histories from He. In that case, we
have Πe = {He}.
In case two histories h1, h2 share an event e but no event later than e,
that event e is a maximum in the intersection of the histories h1 ∩ h2. In
that case, we say that the histories split at e:
Definition 5. (Splitting at a point; choice point) Let h1, h2 ∈ Hist, and let
e ∈ h1 ∩ h2. We say that h1 and h2 split at e, and that e is a choice point
for histories h1 and h2 (h1 ⊥e h2), iff it is not the case that h1 ≡e h2, i.e.,
iff e is a maximal point in h1 ∩ h2.
The existence of choice points has important implications for the topo-
logical properties of the resulting structures, as we noted above and as we
will discuss further in Section 3. At this point, we thus reach an important
question: do the postulates of a common BST structure decide whether there
are choice points? It turns out that the answer is no: we can show that both
the existence and the non-existence of choice points are live options for the
branching of histories in common BST structures. Consider, thus, the two
common BST structures depicted in Figure 1a, b.7 These structures illus-
trate the two possibilities for histories to branch in common BST structures,
thus picturing the nuclei of, on the one hand, the well-developed theory of
BST92 (a), and the “new foundations” theory BSTNF (b), which will be
developed in formal detail in Section 4.8
We provide a formal definition of these structures, so as not rely solely
on pictures. Both structures are defined as quotients of L2 =df R × {1, 2},
the double real line, under the equivalence relations ≡a and ≡b, which are
defined, respectively, as
〈x, i〉 ≡a 〈x′, i′〉 ⇔df (x = x′ ∧ (i = i′ ∨ x  0));
〈x, i〉 ≡b 〈x′, i′〉 ⇔df (x = x′ ∧ (i = i′ ∨ x < 0)).
These relations differ only in their handling of x = 0. The ordering on the
quotient structures Ma =df L2/ ≡a and Mb =df L2/ ≡a is defined uniformly
via
7These structures have just the bare minimum of complexity to fulfill the axioms of
Definition 2 in a non-trivial way: they contain just two histories each. Furthermore, they do
not include any spatial extension—so in fact they are so-called branching time structures
as well.
8The two topological possibilities for branching have been discussed, e.g., by McCall
[12], McCabe [11], and Strobach [22, 208].











Figure 1. Two simple common BST structures a with a choice point and
b without a choice point. Both (a) and (b) depict partial orderings in
which there are two continuous histories branching at point 0. In (a),
point 0 is the shared maximum in the intersection of the histories, i.e.,
a choice point. In (b), the intersection of the histories has no maximum,
and points 01 and 02 are different history-relative suprema (minimal
upper bounds) of the intersection
[〈x, i〉] < [〈x′, i′〉] ⇔df (x < x′ ∧ [〈x, i〉] = [〈x, i′〉]).
It is easy to check that these structures are non-empty partial orderings
without maxima or minima that satisfy the density and continuity (infima
and suprema) conditions of a common BST structure. The two histories
ha1, h
a




2 in Mb are, respectively (for γ one of a or b),
hγ1 = {[〈x, 1〉] ∈ Mγ | x ∈ R}; hγ2 = {[〈x, 2〉] ∈ Mγ | x ∈ R}.




1 ∩ ha2 = {[〈x, 1〉] ∈ Ma | x  0}; lb =df hb1 ∩ hb2 = {[〈x, 1〉] ∈ Mb | x < 0}.
The difference is this: while the chain la in Ma has a maximal element,
[〈0, 1〉], the chain lb in Mb has no maximal element. That latter chain instead
has two different history-relative suprema:
sup
hbi
lb = [〈0, i〉], i = 1, 2.
2.4. Branching via the Prior Choice Principle of BST92
Having exhibited the two options for fulfilling the common BST axioms in a
simple case, we could now enter into a philosophical discussion of what is the
right way to go. We refrain from attempting any a priori arguments here.
One can give good reasons for both options. Thus, in favor of the existence
of choice points, one can argue that a causal account of indeterminstic choice
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requires a special last element of indecision, and thus, a maximal element of
any two branching histories. In favor of the absence of choice points, one can
cite issues of uniformity (it is possible to have branching without maxima
in a uniform way), or topological aspects of the resulting structures. Both
these issues will be discussed in Section 3. In our view, they provide a good
motivation for investigating common BST structures without choice points,
and this is what we will do in Section 4. As a matter of fact, however, BST
theory was developed with the requirement of the existence of choice points,
and the resulting axiomatic theory, BST92, has proved to be fruitful for quite
a number of applications, e.g., to causation [4], to probability theory [13,25],
and to physics [16,17].
So in what follows, we first characterize BST92, which is the BST theory
with choice points, in full formal detail. This requires the addition of just
a single extra axiom to the basis of common BST structures.9 As originally
described by Belnap [1], the theory posits the axioms of a common BST
structure together with the so-called prior choice principle, which we will
denote PCP92 to indicate its historical origin. Basically, PCP92 requires that
whenever an event e belongs to one history h1 but not to another history
h2, these two histories split at a choice point c in the past of e:
e ∈ (h1 \ h2) → ∃c [c < e ∧ h1 ⊥c h2].
It turns out, however, that in order to enforce the transitivity of the relation
of undividedness, PCP92 needs to be formulated not for points, but for lower
bounded chains contained in the difference of two histories, as follows.10
Definition 6. (BST92 prior choice principle, PCP92) A common BST struc-
ture 〈W, <〉 fulfills the BST92 prior choice principle iff it fulfills the following
condition: Let h1, h2 ∈ Hist be two histories, and let l ⊆ (h1\h2) be a lower-
bounded chain that is contained fully in history h1 but does not intersect
history h2. Then there is a choice point c ∈ h1 ∩ h2 s.t. c < l and h1 ⊥c h2,
i.e., c lies properly below l and is a choice point for h1 and h2, which is
maximal in the intersection of h1 and h2.
That definition obviously implies the point version described above, as
any singleton {e} is a lower-bounded chain. It also ensures historical connec-
tion independently of the explicit requirement of Definition 2(8): any two
9 Weiner’s postulate (Definition 2(7)), which was not included in early BST papers
such as Belnap [1], was added later as it was found to be important for developing a useful
probability theory in BST92; see Weiner and Belnap [25] and Müller [13].
10See Belnap [1] for many illustrative examples and for a proof of transitivity of
undividedness.
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different histories have a non-empty difference (see Fact 1(3)), so that they
have to share a choice point.
We can now enter PCP92 in its official form as an additional item to our
list of axioms for BST92:
Definition 7. (BST92 structure) A BST92 structure is a common BST
structure 〈W, <〉 (Definition 2) that also fulfills the BST92 prior choice prin-
ciple (Definition 6).
In the next section, we continue our description of BST92 with a focus on
its topological aspects. In particular, we provide some facts related to local
Euclidicity and Hausdorffness. As indicated, these are the features that are
essential for relating histories in BST to space-time structures studied in
physics.
3. Topological Aspects of BST92
In this section we describe the natural topology for common BST structures,
the so-called diamond topology, in Section 3.1. We comment on some of the
topological features of BST92 in Section 3.2. We will return to topological
issues for the case of BSTNF further down, in Section 4.7.
3.1. General Idea of the Diamond Topology
BST admits a natural topology, introduced by Paul Bartha,11 which we call
the diamond topology. The topology is defined either for W , the base set of
a BST structure, or for a given history h. In the definitions below, MC(e)
(MCh(e)) stands for the set of maximal chains in W (in h) that contain e.
Definition 8. (Diamond topology T on W ) Z is an open subset of W ,
Z ∈ T , iff Z = W or for every e ∈ Z and for every t ∈ MC(e) there are
e1, e2 ∈ t such that e1 < e < e2 and the diamond De1,e2 ⊆ Z, where
De1,e2 =df {e′ ∈ W | e1  e′  e2}.
Definition 9. (History-relative diamond topologies Th on W ) For h ∈ Hist,
Z is an open subset of h, Z ∈ Th, iff Z = h or for every e ∈ Z and for every
t ∈ MCh(e) there are e1, e2 ∈ t such that e1 < e < e2 and the diamond
De1,e2 ⊆ Z.
11Cf. note 26 of Belnap [3].
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It is straightforward to check that indeed T and Th are topologies, i.e.,
both the empty set and the base set (W or h, respectively) are open, the
intersection of two open sets is open, and the union of countably many
open sets is open. The claim of naturalness is based on the observation
that these topologies, if appropriately restricted, coincide with the standard
open-ball topology on Rn, and that the notion of convergence they induce
coincides with the order-theoretic notions of infima and suprema.12 The
history-relative topologies are the so-called subspace topologies induced by
the diamond topology on W , by taking a history as a subspace of W . This
means that A ∈ Th iff there is A′ ∈ T such that A = A′ ∩ h.
In BST92, the global topology and the history-relative topologies have
different features. This fact reflects a problem with local Euclidicity, which
we discuss next.
3.2. Properties of the Diamond Topology for BST92
We review here some facts about diamond topologies in BST92, which are
proved in Placek et al. [18]. The first observation is that, unless 〈W, <〉 is
a one-history structure, a history h is not open in the global topology T ,
whereas it is open by definition in its own history-relative topology Th.
Generally, if A ∈ Th and A contains a choice point, then A ∈ T , so there is
a systematic discrepancy between the global and the history-relative notions
of openness. This discrepancy is reflected in a difference with respect to the
Hausdorff property, which is defined as follows:
Definition 10. (Hausdorff property) A topological space 〈X,T (X)〉 is
Hausdorff iff for any distinct x, y ∈ X there are disjoint open environments
of x and of y, i.e., there are Ox, Oy ∈ T (X) for which Ox ∩ Oy = ∅.
Putting aside pathological structures that prohibit the construction of
light-cones,13 it can be proved that the history-relative topologies Th on
a BST92 structure have the Hausdorff property. This fact stands in sharp
contrast with the properties of the global diamond topology T : if a BST92
structure has more than one history, its global topology is non-Hausdorff
(again barring pathological structures). Moreover, non-Hausdorffness is re-
lated to the existence of upper-bounded chains that have more than one
history-relative supremum. As one might expect, a pair of distinct history-
relative suprema of a chain provides a witness for non-Hausdorffness: if any
12For a discussion of the naturalness of the diamond topology, see Placek et al. [18, §6].
13Such pathological BST92 structures violate one of the conditions C1–C4 of Placek et
al. [18].
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two open sets in T each contain a distinct supremum, they must overlap
because they share some final segment of the chain in question.
In physics it is standardly required that individual space-times be Haus-
dorff (see, e.g., [24], 12). As individual space-times are represented by single
histories in a BST92 structure, we take the above result as showing that
BST92 structures are not in tension with the Hausdorffness requirement of
space-time physics. The non-Hausdorffness of the global topology of a BST92
structure simply reflects the fact that such a structure brings together more
than one space-time, explicitly representing a number of alternative spatio-
temporal developments.
There is, however, another topological feature of BST92 that is highly
problematic, viz., an issue with local Euclidicity,14 which is defined as fol-
lows:
Definition 11. (Local Euclidicity) A topological space 〈X,T (X)〉 is locally
Euclidean of dimension n iff for every x ∈ X there is an open neighborhood
Ox ∈ T (X) and a homeomorphism ϕx that maps Ox onto an open set
Rx ∈ T (Rn).
Local Euclidicity is standardly presupposed (often without explicitly men-
tioning the condition by name) when the notion of a space-time manifold is
introduced. On such a manifold, local coordinates are defined via so-called
charts (see, e.g., [24], 12f.): at each point of the manifold, it is possible to
find a neighborhood that is homeomorphic to some open set of Rn, and the
respective mapping induces the coordinates. If a topological space is not
locally Euclidean, it is not possible to assign coordinates in this way.
Given the frugality of the axioms, BST92 structures come in many vari-
eties. Hence it is not realistic to hope that their global topology will always
be locally Euclidean. One can reasonably require, however, that local Eu-
clidicity should transfer from individual histories to the global structure:
if each history-relative topology Th is locally Euclidean, then the global
topology T should also be locally Euclidean. If we have some collection of
physically reasonable space-times, each with an assignment of coordinates,
then a BST analysis of indeterminism should not destroy the coordinate as-
signment. Unfortunately, local Euclidicity does not transfer from the history-
relative topologies to the global topology of BST92. A case in point is the
simple two-history model of Figure 1a. The overlap of the histories ha1 and
ha2 has a maximal element [〈0, 1〉] = [〈0, 2〉]. According to the definition of
the history-relative diamond topology, the open sets of Thai (i = 1, 2) are
14See Müller [15] for a BST-related discussion.
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either of the form {[〈x, i〉] | x ∈ (c, d)}, for some open interval (c, d) ⊆ R, or
they are unions of such sets. As every element of the history hai belongs to a
set {[〈x, i〉] | x ∈ (c, d)}, and such a set is trivially homeomorphic to an open
interval of R, Thai is locally Euclidean of dimension 1. On the global topology
T on Ma, however, any open neighborhood of the branching point [〈0, 1〉]
must extend somewhat to the trunk and to both the arms, i.e., it must con-
tain subsets {[〈x, 1〉] | x ∈ (c, d)} and {[〈x, 2〉] | x ∈ (c, d′)} with c < 0 and
d, d′ > 0. A fork of that sort, however, cannot be homeomorphically mapped
onto an open interval of the real line. Thus, the global topology of Ma is
not locally Euclidean, despite the fact that each history-relative topology
is. Note that no such problem arises for the structure Mb of Figure 1b, in
which the intersection of the two histories does not have a maximum.
4. New Foundations for BST, Via Transition Structures in BST92
Recall that the underlying goal of branching space-times theories is to pro-
vide a formal framework for analyzing local indeterminism. We have just
seen that one way to achieve that goal, via BST92, leads to the failure of
local Euclidicity, meaning that there is no way to continuously assign spatio-
temporal coordinates to the elements of non-trivial BST92 structures. Our
priority in constructing a “new foundation” theory is to secure local Eu-
clidicity. On the other hand, a violation of the Hausdorff property as in
BST92, i.e., confined to the global level of indeterministic structures and
not already arising at the level of single histories, seems unproblematic. The
task we set ourselves is therefore to develop BST theory in such a way that
there are no choice points. The resulting formal theory will then provide
generalized manifolds, not required to be Hausdorff. On such manifolds one
can do calculus and, more generally, develop some space-time physics.
The perhaps surprising fact is that the sought-for framework is readily
available via the transition structure of a BST92 structure. More precisely,
starting with a BST92 structure, we will define the set of its transitions
and define an ordering relation on it. The resulting partial order turns out
to satisfy all postulates of a common BST structure. However, instead of
PCP92, it satisfies a different prior choice principle, which, crucially, excludes
the existence of maximal elements in the intersection of histories. Quite
generally, histories do not split at points, but rather at more complex objects
that we call choice sets. Given some mild assumptions, the resulting global
structures are provably locally Euclidean.
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In this section we introduce the BST92 notion of a transition (Section 4.1)
and show that the full transition structure of a BST92 structure satisfies
all the postulates of a common BST structure (Section 4.2). The resulting
notion of a choice set and the emerging pattern of branching are discussed in
Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we formulate a new prior choice principle, PCPNF,
and axiomatize the “new foundations” theory BSTNF. In Section 4.5 we
prove that the postulates of BSTNF are satisfied by the transition structure
of a BST92 structure. Some further facts about choice sets are established
in Section 4.6. The crucial topological results for BSTNF are announced and
proved in Section 4.7.
4.1. Transitions
The notion of a transition is a powerful tool for discussing indeterminism.
Belnap [2] picks up the notion from von Wright [23], adding formal rigor.
Generally, a transition is a pair 〈I, O〉, written I  O, in which I is appro-
priately prior to O, and O is, in some appropriate sense, an outcome of I.
Various notions of transitions are discussed in Belnap [4]. For our purposes
we focus on the simplest notion of a transition, a basic transition, which in
BST92 is from a possible point event e to one of the immediate possibilities
open at e, i.e., from e to a member of the partition Πe of the set He of
histories containing e,
τ = e  H, e ∈ W, H ∈ Πe.
Basic transitions are divided up into those that witness local indeterminism,
and those at which, so to speak, nothing happens. The formal distinction
reflects whether or not there are multiple immediate future possibilities open
at e, or just one. Thus, at an indeterministic event e (at a choice point), the
partition Πe has more than one member (histories split at e; there are some
h1, h2 ∈ He for which h1 ⊥e h2), whereas at a deterministic event e, there
is only one immediate possibility for the future, whence for all h1, h2 ∈ He,
we have h1 ≡e h2, and Πe = {He}.
Definition 12. (Deterministic and indeterministic basic transitions) A ba-
sic transition is a pair 〈e, H〉, written e  H, with e ∈ W and H ∈ Πe.
For h ∈ He, we write Πe〈h〉 for the member of Πe that contains h, so that
the basic transition e  Πe〈h〉 is from e to that (unique) basic outcome of
e that contains h. A basic transition is indeterministic iff Πe has more than
one member. On the other hand, if Πe = {He}, then the transition e  He
is called deterministic or trivial.
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We denote the set of basic indeterministic transitions of a BST92 structure
〈W, <〉 by TR(W ), and the set of all basic transitions by TRfull(W ).
The set of basic transitions, whether deterministic or indeterministic,
admits of a natural partial ordering.
Definition 13. (Transition ordering) For τ1 = e1  H1, τ2 = e2  H2,
we say that τ1 precedes τ2, written τ1 ≺ τ2, iff (e1 < e2 and H2 ⊆ H1).
The companion non-strict partial ordering is defined via τ1  τ2 ⇔df (τ1 ≺
τ2 ∨ τ1 = τ2).
4.2. Characterizing the Transition Structure of a BST92 Structure
We are often interested only in indeterministic transitions, as deterministic
transitions make no difference to the branching of histories.15 In the present
context, however, it is important to consider all transitions, including the
ones that are trivial from the point of view of indeterminism. In a BST92
model, we therefore define the full transition structure as follows:
Definition 14. (The full transition structure of a BST92 structure.) Let
〈W, <〉 be a BST92 structure. Then we define the full transition structure
(including trivial transitions), Υ(〈W, <〉), using the transition ordering ≺
from Definition 13, as follows:
Υ(〈W, <〉) =df 〈W ′, ≺〉, where W ′ =df {e  H | e ∈ W, H ∈ Πe}.
From here on we will denote elements resulting from a transformation with
primes.
Having defined the transition structure, we now characterize its prop-
erties. It turns out that the full transition structure Υ(〈W, <〉) looks very
much like the original BST92 structure 〈W, <〉, except for what happens at
the choice points. In fact, we will be able to show that apart from the prior
choice postulate, all defining properties of BST92, i.e., the whole list of prop-
erties of a common BST structure from Definition 2, continue to hold; see
Theorem 1 below. But by failing the PCP92, a transition structure is not
a BST92 structure. With respect to the choice points, the difference is the
following. In BST92, the branching of histories is from a choice point, shared
among the histories that branch, to the immediate possibilities for the fu-
ture at that choice point. There are no first points in these different possible
futures, and this fact leads to the failure of local Euclidicity in the global
BST92 topology (see Section 3.2). In Υ(〈W, <〉), on the other hand, each
choice point is replaced by all the transitions that have that choice point as
15For a study along those lines, see Müller [14].
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an initial. Therefore, where in BST92 there was a last point that was shared
between the different possibilities, in the transition structure there are now
multiple first points characterizing these different possibilities, and there is
no last shared point any more.16 In the structures of Figure 1, the move
from (a) to (b) exactly corresponds to the move from the BST92 structure
Ma to its transition structure Mb.17 For the topological consequences, see
Section 3.2 above and Section 4.7 below.
We now show that the common BST properties of Definition 2 still hold
for the Υ transform of a BST92 structure. As a first easy fact, we note that
Υ(〈W, <〉) is a non-empty partial ordering:
Fact 6. Let 〈W, <〉 be a BST92 structure. Then 〈W ′, ≺〉 =df Υ(〈W, <〉)
is (1) non-empty and (2) a strict partial ordering (3) without maxima or
minima.
Proof. (1) Since W is non-empty, there is some e ∈ W , hence He = ∅
by Fact 1(4). So there is a non-empty H ∈ Πe, and hence there exists a
transition e  H ∈ W ′.
(2) Since < is irreflexive and asymmetric, ≺ is irreflexive and asymmetric
as well. For transitivity, let (e1  H1) ≺ (e2  H2) and (e2  H2) ≺
(e3  H3). By transitivity of < we have e1 < e3. Also, from H2 ⊆ H1 and
H3 ⊆ H2 we have H3 ⊆ H1 by transitivity of ⊆. Together this establishes
(e1  H1) ≺ (e3  H3).
(3) For no maxima, let τ = e  H ∈ W ′, and let h ∈ H ⊆ He. As
W contains no maxima (Definition 2(3)), h contains no maxima either
(Fact 1(5)), so there is e1 ∈ h for which e < e1. Accordingly we have
τ ′ =df e1  Πe1〈h〉 ∈ W ′. It is easy to check that τ ≺ τ ′, which establishes
that τ is not maximal in W ′.
For no minima, similarly, let τ = e  H ∈ W ′. As W contains no
minima, there is e1 ∈ W for which e1 < e. Let h ∈ He. By downward
closure, e1 ∈ h, i.e., h ∈ He1 . So there is τ ′ =df e1  Πe1〈h〉 ∈ W ′, and
τ ′ ≺ τ . Thus, τ is not minimal in W ′.
The following facts about alternatives to the definition of the transition
ordering (Definition 13) will be helpful later on.
Fact 7. Let τ1 = e1  H1, τ2 = e2  H2 be transitions in a BST92
structure 〈W, <〉. (1) Generally, τ1 ≺ τ2 iff (e1 < e2 and He2 ⊆ H1) iff
16This image of fanning out the transitions from a choice point motivates out notation,
Υ.
17To be precise, the transition structure of Ma is order-isomorphic to Mb. See Section 5
for a formal discussion.
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(e1 < e2 and there is some h ∈ He2 for which H1 = Πe1〈h〉). (2) If τ1 is
deterministic, then τ1 ≺ τ2 iff e1 < e2. (3) For the non-strict companion
order, we have τ1  τ2 iff (e1  e2 and H2 ⊆ H1).
Proof. (1) We prove the first “iff”, from which the second follows imme-
diately. Let e1 < e2. We have to show that H2 ⊆ H1 iff He2 ⊆ H1. As
H2 ⊆ He2 , the “⇐” direction is trivial. For “⇒”, assume H2 ⊆ H1, and let
h ∈ H2 and h′ ∈ He2 . We have e2 ∈ h∩h′, which establishes h ≡e1 h′. Since
h ∈ H1 ∈ Πe1 , we have H1 = Πe1〈h〉, and by h ≡e1 h′, h′ ∈ H1 as well. So
indeed, He2 ⊆ H1.
(2) The “⇒” direction is trivial. For “⇐”, let e1 < e2, and assume that
τ1 is deterministic, so that H1 = He1 . We have to show that H2 ⊆ H1.
By downward closure of histories (Fact 1(1)), we have He2 ⊆ He1 , and
H2 ⊆ He2 by definition, so that H2 ⊆ He2 ⊆ He1 = H1. The claim follows
by transitivity of ⊆.
(3) “⇒”: Assume τ1  τ2, i.e., either τ1 ≺ τ2 or τ1 = τ2. In the first case,
the claim follows from the definition of ≺, in the second case the claim is
obvious as then, e1 = e2 and H1 = H2.
“⇐”: Let H2 ⊆ H1, and let e1  e2. Again there are two cases. If e1 = e2,
then as H1, H2 ∈ Πe1 and Πe1 is a partition, H2 ⊆ H1 implies H2 = H1,
whence τ1 = τ2, establishing the claim. The remaining case, e1 < e2 and
H2 ⊆ H1, satisfies the definition of ≺ exactly as in Definition 13.
In order to prove that Υ(〈W, <〉) is a common BST structure, we need
to establish the form that histories, i.e., maximal directed sets, have in that
ordering. Their form is quite intuitive, even though it turns out that the
proof of that fact is somewhat lengthy. We first establish a useful general
fact about directed sets of transitions:
Fact 8. Let T ⊆ Υ(〈W, <〉) be a set of transitions, and let there be e ∈ W
and H1, H2 ∈ Πe, H1 = H2, s.t. both τ1 =df e  H1 and τ2 =df e  H2
are members of T . Then T is not directed.
Proof. Assume otherwise, i.e., assume that there is some τ∗ = e∗  H∗ ∈
T for which τ1  τ∗ and τ2  τ∗. By Fact 7(1), this implies He∗ ⊆ H1 and
He∗ ⊆ H2. But as H1 and H2 are different elements of the partition Πe, we
have H1 ∩ H2 = ∅, contradicting He∗ ⊆ H1 ∩ H2. (Note that He∗ = ∅ by
Fact 1(4).)
Now we can tackle the form of histories in Υ(〈W, <〉).
Lemma 1. Let 〈W, <〉 be a BST92 structure, and let 〈W ′, ≺〉 =df Υ(〈W, <〉).
The histories (maximal directed sets) in 〈W ′, ≺〉 are exactly the sets
Th =df {e  Πe〈h〉 | e ∈ h}
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for h in Hist(W ).
Proof. First we establish that such sets are indeed histories in 〈W ′, ≺〉.
Thus, take some h ∈ Hist(W ), and let Th =df {e  Πe〈h〉 | e ∈ h} ⊆ W ′.
The set Th is directed: take e1  Πe1〈h〉 and e2  Πe2〈h〉 from Th, whence
e1, e2 ∈ h. As h is directed, there is e3 ∈ h such that e1, e2  e3. By
construction, e3  Πe3〈h〉 ∈ Th. And as to the ordering, He3 ⊆ Πe1〈h〉
because e3 ∈ h and e1  e3. Analogously, He3 ⊆ Πe2〈h〉. So indeed (noting
Fact 7(1)), ei  Πei〈h〉  e3  Πe3〈h〉 (i = 1, 2), establishing the common
upper bound. Moreover, Th is maximal directed. To prove this, take some
τ∗ ∈ (W ′ \Th); this transition has the form τ∗ = e∗  H∗ for some e∗ ∈ W ,
H∗ ∈ Πe∗ . There are two cases.
Case 1: There is some τ = e  Πe〈h〉 ∈ Th for which e = e∗, i.e., e∗ ∈ h.
Then, as τ = τ∗, by Fact 8, Th ∪ {τ∗} cannot be directed.
Case 2: There is no τ = e  Πe〈h〉 ∈ Th for which e = e∗, i.e., e∗ ∈ h.
Then we have e∗ ∈ h′ for a different h′ ∈ Hist(W ), and by the BST92 prior
choice principle, there is some c ∈ h ∩ h′ such that c < e∗ and h ⊥c h′. As
c ∈ h, we have τc =df c  Πc〈h〉 ∈ Th. We can now show that Th ∪ {τ∗}
is not directed: there can be no common upper bound for τc and τ∗ in W ′.
Assume for reductio that there is some τ ′ = e′  H ′ ∈ Th ∪ {τ∗} for which
τc  τ ′ and τ∗  τ ′. We can rule out τ ′ = τ∗: we have τc = τ∗ by c < e∗,
and τc ≺ τ∗ as He∗ ⊆ Πc〈h〉 (as He∗ ⊆ Πc〈h′〉). So we must have τ ′ ∈ Th.
By the definition of ≺, the assumed ordering relations imply He′ ⊆ Πc〈h〉
and He′ ⊆ H∗ ⊆ Πc〈h′〉. But we have Πc〈h〉 ∩ Πc〈h′〉 = ∅, contradicting
Fact 1(4).
So, having shown that the sets Th are indeed histories in 〈W ′, ≺〉, we
need to show that all histories in 〈W ′, ≺〉 are of that form. Thus, let g ⊆ W ′
be a history in 〈W ′, ≺〉, maximal directed w.r.t. ≺. By Fact 8, there is no
e ∈ W for which g contains two transitions e  H1 and e  H2, H1 = H2,
so that we can write
g = {e  H(e) | e ∈ E}
for some set E ⊆ W , where H(e) ∈ Πe. We first show that E is directed:
Take e1, e2 ∈ E, so that τi =df ei  H(ei) ∈ g. By directedness of g, there
is some τ3 = e3  H(e3) ∈ g for which τi  τ3 (i = 1, 2), which implies
e3 ∈ E, e1  e3, and e2  e3. This proves that E is directed, and therefore
there is some history h ∈ Hist(W ) for which E ⊆ h. We now show that for
all e ∈ E, we have h ∈ H(e). Thus, take some e ∈ E, which is the initial of
some τ = e  H(e) ∈ g. By Fact 6(3) and Fact 1(5), τ cannot be maximal
in g, i.e., there is some τ ′ = e′  H(e′) ∈ g for which τ ≺ τ ′. This implies
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that He′ ⊆ H(e), and as e′ ∈ E ⊆ h, we have h ∈ He′ and therefore also
h ∈ H(e).
As h ∈ H(e) for all e ∈ E, we have H(e) = Πe〈h〉 for all e ∈ E. This
implies g ⊆ Th, and by Fact 1(3), we have established g = Th.
Given these facts, we can now prove that switching from a BST92 struc-
ture to its full transition structure preserves the common BST structure
axioms.
Theorem 1. Let 〈W, <〉 be a BST92 structure. Its full transition structure
Υ(〈W, <〉) is still a common BST structure according to Definition 2.
Proof. We need to check that 〈W ′, ≺〉 =df Υ(〈W, <〉) satisfies all the prop-
erties (1)–(8) listed in Definition 2.
1. W ′ is non-empty. See Fact 6(1).
2. 〈W ′ ≺〉 is a strict partial ordering. See Fact 6(2).
3. W ′ contains neither maximal nor minimal elements. See Fact 6(3).
4. ≺ is dense.
Let (e1  H1) ≺ (e3  H3), which means that e1 < e3 and H3 ⊆ H1.
By density of <, there is e2 ∈ W for which e1 < e2 < e3. Take some
h ∈ H3, so that {e1, e2, e3} ⊆ h. Let H2 =df Πe2〈h〉. We claim that the
transition e2  H2 is ≺-sliced between the two transitions above. We
have to show that H2 ⊆ H1 and H3 ⊆ H2. For the former, take some
h2 ∈ H2; we have h2 ≡e1 h as witnessed by e2. As H1 ∈ Πe1 , therefore,
h2 ∈ H1 iff h ∈ H1. Now as h ∈ H3 and H3 ⊆ H1, we have h ∈ H1, so
that indeed, H2 ⊆ H1. The latter claim is established analogously.
5. Any lower bounded chain in 〈W ′, ≺〉 has an infimum in ≺.
Let l′ = {ei  Hi | i ∈ K} (K some index set) be a chain that is lower
bounded by e∗  H∗. Then the set l =df {ei | i ∈ K} of initials of l′ is a
chain lower bounded by e∗, and there is a history h ⊆ W for which l ⊆ h.
By the BST92 postulate of infima, l has an infimum v in <. The infimum
v gives rise to the transition v′ =df v  Πv〈h〉 ∈ W ′. Let ei  Hi ∈ l′.
We have v  ei (as ei ∈ l), and Hi ⊆ Πv〈h〉 because ei ∈ h and v  ei.
Thus, v′  (ei  Hi), so v′ is a lower bound of l′. Let now e  H be
any lower bound of l′, whence e is a lower bound of l. As v is the infimum
of l, we have e  v, and as l ⊆ h, we have H = Πe〈h〉, which implies
Hv ⊆ H. Thus e  H  v′, i.e., v′ is indeed the greatest lower bound of
l′.
6. Any upper-bounded chain in 〈W ′, ≺〉 has a history-relative supremum in
each history to which it belongs.
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Let the chain l′ be upper bounded by u′ in 〈W ′, ≺〉 and l′ ∪ {u′} ⊆ h′
for h′ ∈ Hist(W ′, ≺). Given the form of histories in Hist(W ′, ≺) (see
Lemma 1), h′ = {e  Πe〈h〉 | e ∈ h} for some h ∈ Hist(W ). It follows
that for the set l of initials of l′ and for u the initial of u′, l ∪ {u} ⊆ h;
additionally, l  u. By the BST92 axiom of history-relative suprema,
there is a history-relative supremum s = suph l of l in h. Consider now the
transition s′ = s  Πs〈h〉 ∈ h′. That transition is an upper bound of l′:
for any e  H ∈ l′, we have e  s and Hs ⊆ H = Πe〈h〉. Furthermore, s′
is the least upper bound (i.e., the supremum) of l′ in h′: let s∗′ ∈ h′ be an
upper bound of l′ in h′; by the form of histories, s∗′ = s∗  Πs∗〈h〉with
s∗ ∈ h. Thus, s  s∗ (as s is the h-relative supremum of l), and as
s′, s∗′ ∈ h′, by Fact 7(1), we have s′  s∗′.
Summing up, we have established that for l′ ⊆ h′ an upper-bounded chain
in a W ′-history h′ = {e  Πe〈h〉 | e ∈ h} (where h is the corresponding




l′ = s  Πs〈h〉,
where s = suph l.
7. 〈W ′, ≺〉 satisfies the Weiner postulate.
We will employ the claim established at the end of the previous item (6),
and the fact that 〈W, <〉 satisfies the Weiner postulate.
Let h′1, h
′
2 ∈ Hist(W ′), and let h′i = {e  Πe〈hi〉 | e ∈ hi} for hi ∈
Hist(W ) (i = 1, 2). We consider two chains l′, k′ ⊆ h′1∩h′2, their respective
chains of initials l, k ⊆ h1 ∩ h2, and their history-relative suprema s′i =
si  Πsi〈hi〉 = suph′i(l′) and c′i = ci  Πci〈hi〉 = suph′i(k′), where
si = suphi l and ci = suphi k, for i = 1, 2. Suppose that s
′
1  c′1, i.e.,
s1  c1 and Πc1〈h1〉 ⊆ Πs1〈h1〉 (see Fact 7(3)). By the Weiner Postulate
of BST92 applied to the chains l and k, from s1  c1 we may infer s2  c2.
Note that s2 ∈ h2. Hence Πc2〈h2〉 ⊆ Πs2〈h2〉. In terms of the transition




2 ∈ Hist(W ′) be histories, which by Lemma 1 correspond to
h1, h2 ∈ Hist(W ). By historical connection for W , there is some e ∈
h1 ∩ h2, and by no minima, there is some e∗ ∈ W for which e∗ < e. It
follows that e∗ ∈ h1 ∩h2. Let τ =df e∗  Πe∗〈h1〉. By Lemma 1, we have
τ ∈ h′1. Now e > e∗ is a witness for h1 ≡e∗ h2, so that Πe∗〈h1〉 = Πe∗〈h2〉,
i.e., τ ∈ h′2 as well.
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4.3. Characterizing the Branching of Histories in Transition Structures
We can now discuss formally what has become of the BST92 choice points,
and in which sense a prior choice principle still holds in a full transition
structure.
It turns out that when characterizing transition structures, the role of a
choice point e in BST92 is played here by the notion of a choice set ë, which
describes the local point-wise alternatives for e. In introducing choice sets,
we build on some notions introduced above in Section 2.2. We work with
a common BST structure 〈W ′, ≺〉 derived from a BST92 structure 〈W, <〉,
i.e., 〈W ′, ≺〉 =df Υ(〈W, <〉). Generic elements of W ′ are written e, etc., and
histories h, etc. The notions of a chain and of a directed set in this section
are relative to the transition ordering ≺.
Definition 15. (Choice set) For e ∈ W ′, we define the choice set based on






We also call the choice set ë the set of local point-wise alternatives for e.
Note that e then counts as an alternative to itself. The related notions of
alternative histories and history-wise alternatives are defined via the point-
wise alternatives:
Definition 16. (Alternative histories and local history-wise alternatives)
We define the set of alternative histories at ë, Hë, and the set of local history-
wise alternatives for e, Πë, to be
Hë = {h ∈ Hist | h ∩ ë = ∅}; Πë =df {Hs | s ∈ ë}.
In order to spell out the variant of the prior choice principle that is
appropriate for transition structures, we define two new relations between
histories, splitting at a choice set and being undivided at a choice set, written
h1 ⊥ë h2 and h1 ≡ë h2, resp., in analogy to the respective BST92 notions.
In what follows, we will often use two consequences of Fact 3:
18Note that Ce = ∅, as W ′ contains no minima.—Our notation with the double dot
over e is meant to be suggestive of a number of different history-relative suprema on top of
a chain. Think of Figure 1b rotated counterclockwise by 90◦. Graphically, the analogy with
choice partitions for agents, as defined in Belnap et al. [5, Chapter 7C.2], is suggestive.
Note, however, that these partitions pertain to branching time, not BST, and that they
allow for a coarse-graining of the natural partition of undividedness.
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Fact 9. (1) For any h ∈ Hist(W ′) and for any e ∈ W ′, we either have
h ∩ ë = ∅, or h ∩ ë = {e′} for some e′ ∈ ë, i.e., a choice set has at most
one element in common with any history. (2) The set of sets of histories Πë
partitions Hë.
Proof. (1) By Fact 3, no history contains more than one history-relative
supremum of any upper bounded chain.
(2) Exhaustiveness is immediate: by definition, ∪Πë = Hë. To prove
disjointness of the elements of Πë, let H1, H2 ∈ Πë such that H1 = H2.
Then H1 = Hs1 and H2 = Hs2 for two distinct members s1, s2 ∈ ë. Let
h ∈ H1; by (1), we then have h ∈ H2.
Definition 17. Let h1, h2 be histories in Hist(W ′), and let e ∈ W ′. We
require as a presupposition for h1 ≡ë h2 and h1 ⊥ë h2 that h1, h2 ∈ Hë, i.e.,
h1 ∩ ë = ∅ and h2 ∩ ë = ∅. Then the relations are defined as follows:
h1 ≡ë h2 ⇔df h1 ∩ ë = h2 ∩ ë;
h1 ⊥ë h2 ⇔df h1 ∩ ë = h2 ∩ ë.
If h1 ⊥ë h2, we say that the choice set ë is a choice set for histories h1
and h2. We can establish the following fact about the interrelation of the
relations ⊥ë and ≡ë:
Fact 10. Let e ∈ W and let h1, h2 ∈ Hë. Then ≡ë and ⊥ë are mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive: we have h1 ≡ë h2 iff not h1 ⊥ë h2.
Proof. Given the assumptions, we have h1∩ ë = {s1} and h2∩ ë = {s2} for
some s1, s2 ∈ ë. Now by our definitions, h1 ≡ë h2 iff s1 = s2, and h1 ⊥ë h2
iff s1 = s2. These are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive alternatives.
Fact 11. (1) The relation ≡ë is an equivalence relation on the set of alter-
native histories at ë, Hë. (2) We have Πë = Hë/ ≡ë.
Proof. (1) Let h1, h2, h3 ∈ Hë. By Fact 9(1), we have hi ∩ ë = {si} (i =
1, 2, 3) for some s1, s2, s3 ∈ ë. We have to establish reflexivity, symmetry and
transitivity. Reflexivity and symmetry are trivial. For transitivity, assume
h1 ≡ë h2 and h2 ≡ë h3, which holds iff s1 = s2 and s2 = s3. By transitivity
of identity, s1 = s3, which implies h1 ≡ë h3. So Hë/ ≡ë is a partition of Hë.
To see that this is the same partition as Πë characterized in Fact 9(2), note
that Hs1 = Hs2 iff s1 = s2.
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4.4. Introducing new Foundations: BSTNF
With the required notions at hand, we can now propose a new prior choice
principle, PCPNF. That principle is crucial for our new foundations: will later
show that PCPNF holds in BST92 transition structures, which themselves
are not BST92 structures (see Lemma 2 below):
Definition 18. (PCPNF) Let h1, h2 ∈ Hist(W ), and let l be a lower
bounded chain for which l ⊆ h1 but l ∩ h2 = ∅. Then there is some e ∈ W
for which e  l and for which the set ë of local alternatives to e satisfies
h1 ⊥ë h2.
Note the weak relation e  l in the formulation of PCPNF, in contradis-
tinction to the strict relation in the formulation of the BST92 PCP in Defi-
nition 6. For example, if l has just one element c such that c ∈ h1 \ h2 and
c is an element of a non-trivial choice set c̈ = {c}, then the choice set for c
is just c̈ itself, and h1 ⊥c̈ h2. In such a case we only have the weak ordering
relation, c  l.
Having proposed a new prior choice principle, we can now give a full
definition of “new foundations” BST, BSTNF:
Definition 19. (BSTNF structure) A partial ordering 〈W, 〉 is a structure
of BSTNFiff it is a common BST structure (Definition 2) for which the
PCPNF (Definition 18) holds.
BSTNF structures, being common BST structures, satisfy historical con-
nection just as BST92 structures do. The new PCPNF, however, implies
that the branching of histories in BSTNF is different from the branching in
terms of choice points in BST92: there can be no maximal elements in the
intersection of histories in a BSTNF structure.
Fact 12. Let h1, h2 be two histories in a BSTNF structure 〈W, <〉, h1 = h2.
Then h1 ∩ h2, which is non-empty, contains no maximal elements. Accord-
ingly, for any e ∈ W , if e ∈ h1 ∩ h2, then h1 ≡e h2, where ≡e is the BST92
notion of undividedness.
Proof. By historical connection, h1 ∩ h2 = ∅. Assume for reductio that
there is an e ∈ h1 ∩ h2 that is maximal in h1 ∩ h2, i.e., for all e′ ∈ W , if
e < e′, then e′ ∈ h1∩h2. By the Zorn-Kuratowski lemma, there is a maximal
lower bounded chain J ⊆ {x ∈ h1 | e  x} in the h1-future of e. As e ∈ J ,
we have inf J = e, and by no maxima, J ′ =df J \ {e} = ∅. By Fact 4, e is
also the infimum of J ′. As we have J ′ ⊆ h1 \ h2, by PCPNF there is c̈ with
some c1, c2 ∈ c̈ such that c1 ∈ h1, c2 ∈ h2, h1 ∩ c̈ = {c1} = {c2} = h2 ∩ c̈,
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and c1  J ′. Then c1 and c2 cannot share a history (by Fact 9(1)). However,
since e = inf J ′, by the definition of inifima, c1  e, and as histories are
downward closed, c1 ∈ h2. But we have c2 ∈ h2 as well, which contradicts
Fact 9(1).
4.5. BST92 Transition Structures are BSTNF Structures
We can now show that the full transition structure of a BST92 structure is
indeed a BSTNF structure. The only thing that is still missing is to show that
the new prior choice principle is satisfied. To this end we need an auxiliary
fact that shows how BST92 choice points give rise to BSTNF choice sets: in
the transition structure, a BST92 choice point c is replaced by all the basic
transitions with initial c, such that these transitions together form a choice
set in the resulting structure.
Fact 13. Let 〈W, <〉 be a BST92 structure, and let h1 ⊥c h2 for h1, h2 ∈
Hist(W ). Then c′1 =df c  Πc〈h1〉 and c′2 =df c  Πc〈h2〉 belong to
Υ(〈W, <〉) and are elements of a choice set c̈ for which h′1 ⊥c̈ h′2, where
h′i = {e  Πe〈hi〉 | e ∈ hi} (i = 1, 2) are the histories in Υ(〈W, <〉)
corresponding to h1 and h2.
Proof. Let 〈W ′, <′〉 =df Υ(〈W, <〉), let h1, h2 ∈ Hist(W ), and let c ∈
h1∩h2 be s.t. h1 ⊥c h2. By Lemma 1, h′i = {e  Πe〈hi〉 | e ∈ hi} ∈ Hist(W ′)
(i = 1, 2). Let c′i =df c  Πc〈hi〉, so that c′i ∈ h′i (i = 1, 2). In order to show
that c′1, c
′
2 are elements of a choice set c̈ that fulfills h
′
1 ⊥c̈ h′2, we need to
show that every chain l′ ∈ Cc′1 , for which suph′1 l′ = c′1, has c′2 as another
history-relative supremum, and vice versa. Since W (and thereby W ′) has
no minimal elements, Cc′1 = ∅. Pick an arbitrary chain l′ ∈ Cc′1 , and note
that it has the form l′ = {e  Πe〈h1〉 | e ∈ l} for some chain l ⊆ h1,
with c = suph1 l. Since h1 ⊥c h2, l ⊆ h2 as well, and as l < c, we have
that for every e ∈ l, Πe〈h1〉 = Πe〈h2〉. Hence l′ ⊆ h′1 ∩ h′2. It follows that
suph′1 l
′ = c′1 and suph′2 l
′ = c′2 (note that the c
′
i ∈ h′i are upper bounds of l′
and that their initial, c, is the h1- as well as the h2-relative supremum of l).
Since l′ is an arbitrary chain in Cc′1 , we showed that every chain in Cc′1 has
at least two history-relative suprema, c′1 and c
′
2, i.e., there is a choice set c̈
′
s.t {c′1, c′2} ⊆ c̈′. Since h′1 ∩ c̈′ = c′1 = c′2 = h′2 ∩ c̈′, we have h′1 ⊥c̈′ h′2.
Given this auxiliary fact, we can establish our lemma:
Lemma 2. Let 〈W, <〉 be a BST92 structure. Then that structure’s full tran-
sition structure 〈W ′, <′〉 =df Υ(〈W, <〉) fulfills the new prior choice principle
according to Definition 18.
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Proof. Let l′ be a chain in 〈W ′, <′〉 that is lower bounded by u′, and let
h′1, h
′
2 ∈ Hist(W ′) be such that (†) l′ ⊆ h′1 but (‡) l′ ∩ h′2 = ∅. By Lemma 1,
h′i = {e  Πe〈hi〉 | e ∈ hi} for some hi ∈ Hist(W ), i = 1, 2. By (†) we have
that l′ = {e  Πe〈h1〉 | e ∈ l} for a chain l ⊆ h1 that is lower bounded by u,
where u is the initial of u′. By (‡), for every e  Πe〈h1〉 ∈ l′, either e ∈ h2,
or (e ∈ h2 but Πe〈h1〉 = Πe〈h2〉). There are now three cases, depending on
the form of l′: (i) l′ has a minimal element v′ = v  Πv〈h1〉, v ∈ h1 ∩ h2,
and Πv〈h1〉 = Πv〈h2〉, or (ii) l′ has a minimal element v′ = v  Πv〈h1〉,
v ∈ h1 ∩ h2, but Πv〈h1〉 = Πv〈h2〉, or (iii) l′ either has no minimal element
at all, or for the minimal element v′ = v  Πv〈h1〉 of l′, v ∈ h1 \h2. Case (i)
is impossible as it contradicts (‡). Consider then case (ii): since h1 ⊥v h2,
by Fact 13 the two transitions, v′1 = v  Πv〈h1〉 and v′2 = v  Πv〈h2〉
are distinct elements of a choice set v̈′ at which histories h′1 and h
′
2 split,
h′1 ⊥v̈′ h′2. Furthermore, as v′1 is the minimal element of l′, v′1  l′, as
required by PCPNF. Finally, in case (iii), no element e ∈ l can belong to
h2: if l′ has a minimum v′ = v  Πv〈h1〉 with v ∈ h1 \ h2, no point above
v can belong to h2 (Fact 1(2)), and in case l′ has no minimum at all, the
assumption that e ∈ l ∩ h2 implies that there is also some other e1 ∈ l ∩ h
with e1 < e, and hence e1  Πe1〈h2〉 ∈ l′ ∩ h′2, contradicting (‡). Thus,
l∩h2 = ∅. Applying the PCP of BST92 to the chain l ⊆ h1 \h2 that is lower
bounded by u, we get v ∈ W such that v < l and h1 ⊥v h2. Exactly like
in case (ii) we thus invoke Fact 13 to produce the sought-for choice set v̈′
containing v  Πv〈h1〉 and v  Πv〈h2〉, for which h′1 ⊥v̈′ h′2. Since v < l
and given the form of l′, we have v  Πv〈h1〉  l′ as well.
Given this result, we have shown that the full transition structure of a
BST92 structure is a BSTNF structure:
Theorem 2. Let 〈W, <〉 be a BST92 structure. Then that structure’s full
transition structure Υ(〈W, <〉) is a BSTNF structure.
Proof. From Theorem 1 and Lemma 2.
4.6. Facts About Choice Sets
In this section we prove a few facts related to sets of local point-wise alter-
natives and sets of local history-wise alternatives, which will also justify our
terminology. Our main result is Theorem 3, which states that choice sets
fully capture the notion of a local alternative in BSTNF.
Fact 14. Let there be h1, h2 and e ∈ W such that h1 ⊥ë h2. Then there is
no c < e for which h1 ⊥c̈ h2.
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Proof. Assume for reductio that h1 ⊥c̈ h2 for some c1 < e, where c1 ∈
h1 ∩ c̈. Then there are c1, c2 ∈ c̈ for which c̈ ∩ h1 = c1 = c2 = c̈ ∩ h2. By
c1 < e there is some l ∈ Ce with c1 ∈ l. By h1 ⊥ë h2, we have l ⊆ h1 ∩ h2.
But this implies c1 ∈ h2, so that {c1, c2} ⊆ h2, contradicting Fact 9(1).
Lemma 3. Let s ∈ ë for some e ∈ W . Then we have x < s iff x < e, i.e.,
Pe = Ps.
Proof. If e = s, there is nothing to prove. Thus, assume e = s.
“⇐”: Let s ∈ ë, and let x < e. By the Zorn-Kuratowski lemma, there
is some chain l ∈ Ce for which x ∈ l. As s ∈ ë, we know that there is
some h ∈ Hist for which suph l = s. We cannot have s ∈ l: otherwise, for
h′ witnessing suph′ l = e, we would have {e, s} ⊆ h′, contradicting Fact 3.
Thus, l < s, which implies x < s.
“⇒”: Let s ∈ ë, and let x < s. Assume for reductio that x < e. We first
show that under this assumption, x and e cannot share a history. Assume
otherwise, and let h1 ∈ He ∩ Hx. Let h2 ∈ Hs. Take some l ∈ Ce. We have
x ∈ h1, x ∈ h2 (by downward closure of histories, as x < s), and l ⊆ h1 (as
e ∈ h1). Now, as s ∈ h2 and s ∈ ë, we have l < s, so by downward closure
of histories, l ⊆ h2 as well. Noting that suph2{x} = x < s = suph2 l, the
Weiner postulate implies that suph1{x} = x < e = suph1 l, contradicting
the assumption that x < e.
Under our reductio assumption, x and e do not share a history. Choose
some h1 ∈ He and some h2 ∈ Hs. Since s ∈ ë and e = s, clearly h1 ⊥ë h2.
Moreover, by downward closure of histories we have x ∈ h2, and as e ∈ h1
and x and e do not share a history, x ∈ h1. By PCPNF applied to x ∈ h2\h1,
there is c ∈ W such that h1 ⊥c̈ h2 and c  x, and hence c < s and
c ∈ h2. And there is c′ ∈ c̈ such that c′ ∈ h1. Picking I ∈ Ce and J ∈ Cc,
I, J ⊆ h1∩h2 and observing c = suph2 J < suph2 I = s, the Weiner Postulate
implies c′ = suph1 J < suph1 I = e. But by Fact 14 then h1 and h2 cannot
split at c̈, if they split at ë, where c′ < e. So, on our reductio assumption
x < e, we have derived a contradiction, which proves that x < e.
Given Lemma 3 it is also not difficult to see that for s ∈ ë, a chain ends
in e iff it ends in s:
Fact 15. Let s ∈ ë. Then we have l ∈ Cs iff l ∈ Ce.
Proof. If e = s, there is nothing to prove. Thus, assume e = s.
“⇐”: Given s ∈ ë and l ∈ Ce, by the definition of ë there is some history
h for which suph l = s, which implies l ∈ Cs.
“⇒”: Let s ∈ ë, and let l ∈ Cs, i.e., l < s and for some h ∈ Hs, suph l = s.
By Lemma 3, l < e. Take some h′ ∈ He, and pick some J ∈ Ce, so J < e,
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and hence J ⊆ h′. Then we also have J < s (given s ∈ ë), which gives us
J ⊆ h. We have suph l = s = suph J . Thus, by the Weiner postulate, we
also have suph′ l = suph′ J = e, and therefore, l ∈ Ce.
It follows that the set ë is independent of the witness chosen:
Fact 16. Let s ∈ ë. Then e ∈ s̈.
Proof. Let s ∈ ë. We have to show that e ∈ s̈, i.e., e ∈ S (I) for all I ∈ Cs.
Thus consider an arbitrary I ∈ Cs. By Fact 15, I ∈ Ce. Now take some
h ∈ He; we have suph I = e, i.e., e ∈ S (I). As I was arbitrary, we have
e ∈ s̈.
Lemma 4. We have s ∈ ë iff ë = s̈.
Proof. “⇐”: Immediate, since s ∈ s̈ by Definition 15.
“⇒”: Let s ∈ ë. For s = e there is nothing to prove, so we assume s = e.
“⊆”: Let x ∈ ë. We have to show that x ∈ s̈, i.e., that x ∈ S (l) for all
l ∈ Cs. Thus, take some l ∈ Cs. By Fact 15, l ∈ Ce, and as x ∈ ë, we have
x ∈ S (l).
“⊇”: Let x ∈ s̈. Take some l ∈ Ce. As above, by Fact 15, l ∈ Cs, and as
x ∈ s̈, we have x ∈ S (l).
Having prepared the ground, we can now finally justify calling the parti-
tion Πë the set of local history-wise alternatives: The set of sets of histories
Πë partitions the set of histories containing Pe. That is, any history con-
taining the whole proper past of e ends up in exactly one of the elements of
Πë.
Theorem 3. Let e ∈ W . Then Πë partitions H[Pe], i.e.: (1) For H1, H2 ∈
Πë, if H1 = H2, then H1 ∩ H2 = ∅; (2) ∪Πë = Hë = H[Pe].
Proof. (1) Let H1, H2 ∈ Πë. By Fact 9(2), if H1 = H2, then H1 ∩ H2 = ∅.
(2) We have to show that ∪Πë = H[Pe]. Note that ∪Πë = Hë by Fact 9(2).
“⊆”: Take h ∈ ∪Πë, i.e., h ∈ Hs for some s ∈ ë. By the definition of Ps, we
have Ps ⊆ h, and by Lemma 3, Pe ⊆ h. Thus, h ∈ H[Pe].
“⊇”: Take h ∈ H[Pe], so that Pe ⊆ h. By Fact 5, for all l ∈ Ce we have
l ⊆ h. Take some l0 ∈ Ce, and let s =df suph l0. We can show that s is
the h-relative supremum of any chain from Ce. Fix some h′ ∈ He. Take any
l ∈ Ce. We have suph′ l = e = suph′ l0, and thus by Weiner’s postulate we
also have suph l = suph l0 = s. Thus we have s ∈ S (l) for any l ∈ Ce, which
implies s ∈ ë. As h ∈ Hs, we have h ∈ ∪Πë.
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The main message of the constructions studied in this section is that some
e ∈ W generate non-trivial choice sets ë, in the sense that ë = {e}. Such
a set ë indeed consists of local point-wise alternatives to e. We can think
of a choice set as a set of “indeterministic transitions”, and each choice set
induces a set of history-wise alternatives for e, namely Πë. Finally, PCPNF
requires that any two histories split at a choice set. So, in BSTNF the basic
concepts of branching histories still apply, but in a slightly different way from
BST92. As we will show now, this has the beneficial topological consequences
announced earlier.
4.7. The Diamond Topology in BSTNF
In this section we return to the motivation of this paper, that is, the idea
that a framework for local indeterminism should preserve local Euclidicity: if
each history (space-time) is locally Euclidean of dimension n, then the global
topology should be locally Euclidean of dimension n as well. As we saw in
Section 3.2, the diamond topology on BST92 structures does not preserve
local Euclidicity when moving from the history-relative topologies to the
global topology. In contrast, we can prove that the diamond topology on
BSTNF structures preserves local Euclidicity. Working towards Theorem 4
about the preservation of local Euclidicity, we first need an auxiliary lemma,
which is also of interest of its own. Recall the disturbing feature of BST92
discussed in Section 3.2: a set that is open in a history-relative topology
need not be open in the corresponding global topology. In fact, no such set
is open in the global topology if it contains a choice point. The Lemma
below states that the opposite holds for the diamond topology on BSTNF
structures:
Lemma 5. Let a BSTNF model 〈W, 〉 be given, let h ∈ Hist(W ), and let
Z ⊆ W be such that Z ∈ Th, i.e., Z is an open set w.r.t. the history-relative
topology Th. Then Z ∈ T , i.e., Z is also open w.r.t. the global topology on
W .
Proof. Let Z ∈ Th for some h ∈ Hist. Let e ∈ Z, and let t ∈ MC(e). In
order to establish the openness of Z w.r.t T , we need to show that there
is an e-centered diamond with vertices on t wholly contained in Z. The
openness of Z w.r.t. Th gives us such a diamond for any th ∈ MCh(e), but
not necessarily for our given t ∈ MC(e).
We show that the given t has a segment both below and above e that is
contained in some th ∈ MCh(e), proceeding in two steps. First, we claim
that t contains some e′ ∈ h for which e′ > e. Assume otherwise, i.e., the
chain t+ =df {e∗ ∈ t | e∗ > e} contains no element of h. Note that by
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construction, inf t+ = e. As t+ is a chain, it is directed, and thus wholly
contained in some history h2. Pulling these facts together, t+ ⊆ h2 \ h,
and by the maximality of t and the construction of t+, we have that t+
is a maximal chain in h2 \ h. The PCPNF gives us a choice set c̈ s.t. (†)
h ⊥c̈ h2, and for the c′ ∈ c̈ ∩ h2, we have c′  t+. We observe next that
from the fact that t+ is a maximal chain in h2 \h, it follows that c′ = inf t+.
Otherwise, for i = inf t+ we would have c′ < i  t+. By (†) we have c′ ∈ h,
so {c′}∪ t+ ⊆ h2 \h. As this chain extends t+, it contradicts the maximality
of t+ in h2 \ h. Thus, c′ = inf t+, whence c′ = e. It follows that e ∈ h2 \ h,
which contradicts our initial assumption that e ∈ h. So indeed, t contains
some e′ ∈ h for which e′ > e.
Second, we construct th by starting with an initial segment of the given
t, as follows: Let t− =df {e∗ ∈ t | e∗  e′}; we have t− ⊆ h and e ∈ t−.
By the Zorn-Kuratowski lemma we can extend t− with elements of h to
form a maximal chain th, so that th ∈ MCh(e). The chains t and th share
the initial segment t−. We can now invoke the openness of Z w.r.t. Th
for e and th, which gives us a diamond Deh1 ,eh2 ⊆ Z for which eh1 , eh2 ∈ th
and eh1 < e < e
h
2 . We set e1 =df e
h
1 and e2 =df min{e′, eh2}. We thus have
e1 < e < e2 with e1 = eh1 ∈ t, and also e2 ∈ t because e′ ∈ t. And
as the diamond De1,e2 ⊆ Deh1 ,eh2 , we have De1,e2 ⊆ Z. So we have found
the witnessing e-centered diamond with vertices on t, which establishes the
openness of Z w.r.t. T .
With the above lemma at hand, we can prove the mentioned theorem:
Theorem 4. Let 〈W, <〉 be a BSTNF structure. If there is an n ∈ N such
that for every h ∈ Hist(W ), the topological space 〈h,Th〉 is locally Euclidean
with dimension n, then the topological space 〈W,T 〉 is also locally Euclidean
with dimension n.
Proof. We need to show that each e ∈ W has a neighborhood Oe ∈ T that
is mapped by some homeomorphism ϕe to an open set Re ∈ T (Rn). Let
e ∈ W , and pick some h ∈ He. Since h is locally Euclidean with respect to
Th, there is a Th-open neighborhood Ohe ⊆ h of e, an open set of Rn, Rhe ∈




e ] = R
h
e . By Lemma 5,
from Ohe ∈ Th it follows that Ohe ∈ T . We let Oe =df Ohe , Re =df Rhe , and
we can use ϕe =df ϕhe as our homeomorphism between the open sets Oe ∈ T
and Re ∈ T (Rn).
BSTNF thus vindicates the idea that if one starts with locally Euclidean
histories (space-times) that allow for the assignment of spatio-temporal co-
ordinates, one does not destroy that feature by analyzing indeterminism
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within the framework of branching space-times. This is in marked contrast
with the situation in BST92, in which local Euclidicity does not transfer
from the individual histories to the global branching structure.19 So, if one
wants to analyze local indeterminism in branching structures that retain
local Euclidicity, one has to choose the framework of BSTNF.
With respect to the topological condition of Hausdorffness, on the other
hand, the two frameworks are on a par: Apart from some trivial cases,20
both BST92 structures and BSTNF structures are non-Hausdorff even if their
individual histories are Hausdorff.
What is the significance of the failure of transferring topological prop-
erties of individual histories to the global structure? Arguably, transfer
of local Euclidicity is much more important. Local Euclidicity guarantees
the ascription of spatio-temporal coordinates (sets of real numbers) to any
spatio-temporal event. The idea that such events have coordinates is deeply
entrenched in our concept of space-time. Perhaps there are ways to ascribe
coordinates to events that do not require local Euclidicity, but that condi-
tion is used in standard physical theories of space-time. Thus, abandoning
local Euclidicity will mark a revolutionary break with with the established
practice of physics. We thus claim that local Euclidicity should hold both
in each history (individual space-time) and in a global BST structure that
represents the totality of all possible spatio-temporal events.
The Hausdorff property has a different status. It is standardly postulated
to hold in structures representing space-times in General Relativity: theses
structures, differential manifolds, are Hausdorff by definition. However, there
have been attempts to relax the Hausdorff property, motivated by particular
candidates for space-time. It can also be argued that the Hausdorff property
is not needed in General Relativity and can be abandoned at a small price
[9]. Finally, there is a method of gluing (Hausdorff) differential manifolds
into a larger structure, a so-call generalized manifold, that is not Haudorff.
It is natural to interpret this result as a modal representation of a family
of alternative space-times that overlap on some region [10]. Accordingly,
histories should be Hausdorff, but global structures with multiple alternative
histories will violate Hausdorffness.
19Compare our discussion following Definition 11 in Section 3.2.
20Main examples are one-dimensional structures of BST92 such as pictured in Figure 1.
Also, one-history structures are, of course, Hausdorff if their single history is.
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5. From New Foundations to Old Foundations and Back Again
Our target in this section is a set of theorems establishing that we can move
freely between BST92 and BSTNF while preserving the basic indeterministic
structure. In Section 5.1 we will show that given a BSTNF structure, we
can define an accompanying BST92 structure via a transformation detailed
in Definition 20, in parallel to the derivation of a BSTNF structure from a
BST92 structure above. In Section 5.2, we will then show that the concate-
nation of these two translations, in any order, is an order isomorphism. In
this way, BST92 and BSTNF can be seen as two alternative representations
of the same underlying indeterministic structure. This means that we can
represent indeterministic scenarios without having to decide between the
different prior choice principles of BST92 and BSTNF.
5.1. From New Foundations BSTNF to BST92
We have seen how the move from a BST92 structure to its full transition
structure brings us from BST92 to BSTNF. In the other direction, there
is also a fairly simple translation, viz., combining, or collapsing, all the
elements of a choice set to form a single point. The elements of a choice set
constitute different history-relative suprema of a chain without an endpoint.
The transform, in contrast, contains a chain with a unique endpoint, after
which the different outcomes have no first elements.
Definition 20. (The Λ transformation from BSTNFto BST92.) Let 〈W, <〉
be a BSTNF model. Then we define the companion Λ-transformed (“col-
lapsed”) model as follows:21
Λ(〈W, <〉) =df 〈W ′, <′〉, where
W ′ =df {ë | e ∈ W}; ë1 <′ ë2 iff e′1 < e′2 for some e′1 ∈ ë1, e′2 ∈ ë2.
It will be useful to extend the Λ-notation to elements and subsets of W , so
that Λ(e) =df ë, and Λ(E) =df {ë | e ∈ E}.
Fact 17. (Facts about Definition 20) The following holds:
1. Let e1, e2 ∈ W and let e1 < e2. Then Λ(e1) <′ Λ(e2).
2. Let t ⊆ W be a chain (w.r.t. <). Then Λ(t) is a chain (w.r.t. <′).
3. Let E ⊆ W be directed. Then Λ(E) is also directed.
21Graphically, we have chosen “Λ” as the reverse of “Υ”. Note that from here on, we
denote the BSTNF structures as (unprimed) 〈W,<〉 and the Λ-transformed structures with
primes.
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Proof. (1): holds by the definition of <′. (2) and (3) follow immediately.
Fact 18. (Justification of the notation in Definition 20) In BSTNF: (1) If
e1 < e2 and e′2 ∈ ë2, then e1 < e′2. So we can write e1 <′ ë2. (2) If e1 <′ ë2
and e∗1 ∈ ë1, e1 = e∗1, then e∗1 <′ ë2. So given ë1 <′ ë2, there is a unique
e1 ∈ ë1 for which e1 <′ ë2. (3) If ë1 <′ ë2, then there are no e∗i ∈ ëi (i = 1, 2)
for which e∗2 < e
∗
1.
Proof. (1): By Fact 15.
(2): Let e1 <′ ë2 as witnessed by e2 (i.e., e1 < e2), and e∗1 ∈ ë1, e1 = e∗1.
Assume for reductio e∗1 <
′ ë2, then there has to be some witness e∗2 ∈ ë2 for
which e∗1 < e
∗
2. Then by (1), we also have e
∗
1 < e2, so that (by downward
closure of histories) there is a history containing e1 and e∗1, contradicting
Fact 9(1).
(3): Let ë1 <′ ë2 as witnessed by e1 and e2 (i.e., e1 ∈ ë1, e2 ∈ ë2, and
e1 < e2). Assume for reductio that there are e∗1 ∈ ë1 and e∗2 ∈ ë2 for which
e∗2 < e
∗
1. Then by (1), we have e1 < e
∗
2, and by transitivity, e1 < e
∗
1. Thereby
e1 and e∗1, being different elements of ë1 (by irreflexivity of <), would have
to belong to one history, contradicting Fact 9(1).
Similarly to what we established about the properties of the transition
structure of a BST92 structure, we can characterize the Λ-transform of a
BSTNF structure. It turns out that, as announced, the Λ-transform leads us
back to BST92. As above, we split the proof into a number of steps.
Fact 19. Let 〈W, <〉 be a BSTNF model, and let 〈W ′, <′〉 =df Λ(〈W, <〉).
Then 〈W ′, <′〉 is (1) non-empty and (2) a strict partial ordering (3) without
minima or maxima.
Proof. (1) By construction, W ′ is non-empty (given that W was non-
empty).
(2) Asymmetry follows from Fact 18(3). For transitivity, let ë1 <′ ë2 and
ë2 <
′ ë3. Then by Fact 18(2), there is a unique e2 ∈ ë2 for which e2 <′ ë3,
and a unique e1 ∈ ë1 for which e1 <′ ë2. So by e2 ∈ ë2 and by transitivity
of < we have e1 <′ ë3, which proves ë1 <′ ë3.
(3) Let ë ∈ W ′. There is some e1 ∈ W for which ë = Λ(e1). As W has no
maximal nor minimal elements, there are e2, e3 ∈ W for which e2 < e1 < e3.
Then by the definition of the ordering, ë2 <′ Λ(e1) = ë, establishing that ë
cannot be a minimum, and Λ(e1) = ë <′ ë3, establishing that ë cannot be a
maximum.
Before we can establish history-relative suprema of upper bounded chains,
we need to prove a lemma about the form of histories in W ′.
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Lemma 6. Let 〈W, <〉 be a BSTNF model, and let 〈W ′, <′〉 =df Λ(〈W, <〉).
The histories (maximal directed sets) in 〈W ′, <′〉 are exactly the sets Λ(h),
for h ∈ Hist(W ). That is, (1) for h ∈ Hist(W ), the set Λ(h) is maximal
directed and (2) for any maximal directed set h′ ∈ Hist(W ′) there is a unique
history h ∈ Hist(W ) s.t. h′ = Λ(h).
Proof. (1) The set Λ(h) ⊆ W ′ is directed by Fact 17(3), so there is
some maximal directed h′ ∈ Hist(W ′) for which Λ(h) ⊆ h′. Note that by
Facts 19(3) and 1 (5), h′ cannot have a maximum. This allows us to define
a function f : h′ → W that establishes the converse of Λ on h′, in the fol-
lowing sense: (i) for any ë ∈ h′, Λ(f(ë)) = ë, (ii) for any ë1, ë2 ∈ h′, we have
ë1 <
′ ë2 iff f(ë1) < f(ë2), and (iii) for any e ∈ h, f(Λ(e)) = e. (Note that
the primed histories and the primed ordering refer to Λ(〈W, <〉), not to the
BSTNF structure.)
To define f , let ë1 ∈ h′. Let ë2 ∈ h′ s.t. ë1 <′ ë2; such an element exists
as h′ has no maxima. By Fact 18(2), there is a unique v ∈ W for which
ë1 = Λ(v) and v <′ ë2. That v is, moreover, independent of the chosen
upper bound ë2 ∈ h′: let v∗ ∈ ë1 be such that v∗ <′ ë3 for some ë3 ∈ h′ for
which ë1 <′ ë3. Then by directedness of h′, there is some common upper
bound ë4 of ë2 and ë3, and again invoking Fact 18(2), we have v∗ = v. So we
can set f(ë1) = v as specified. Note that thereby, f(ë1) ∈ ë1. Constraint (i)
holds by construction, as Λ(f(ë)) = Λ(v) = ë. For (ii, “⇒”), let ë1, ë2 ∈ h′
satisfy ë1 <′ ë2. Then f(ë1) <′ ë2 by construction (as ë2 is an upper bound
of ë1 in h′), and the claim follows by Fact 18(1), noting that f(ë2) ∈ ë2.
For (ii, “⇐”), let ë1, ë2 ∈ h′ be such that f(ë1) < f(ë2). By (i) and by the
definition of the ordering <′, this implies ë1 <′ ë2. For (iii), let e1 ∈ h. As h
contains no maxima, there is some e2 ∈ h for which e1 < e2. Let ëi = Λ(ei)
(i = 1, 2), so that (by the definition of <′) we have ë1 <′ ë2. By the definition
of f , f(ë1) = e∗ for the unique member e∗ ∈ ë1 for which e∗ <′ ë2. Given
e1 < e2, we have e∗ = e1, i.e., f(Λ(e1)) = f(ë1) = e1.
Now for maximality of the directed set Λ(h) ⊆ h′, assume for reductio
that h′ = Λ(h) ∪ A′ with Λ(h) ∩ A′ = ∅ and A′ = ∅ (i.e., assume that Λ(h)
is not maximal directed). Let A =df {f(ë) | ë ∈ A′}, so that A = ∅ and
A ∩ h = ∅. By property (ii) of f , h ∪ A is directed, violating the maximality
of h.
(2) Let h′ ∈ Hist(W ′), and define f as above. Let E =df {f(ë) | ë ∈ h′},
so that by (i), Λ(E) = h′. By (ii), E is directed, so that there is some
h ∈ Hist(W ) with E ⊆ h. It follows that h′ = Λ(E) ⊆ Λ(h). By (1), we
have that Λ(h) = h′′ for some h′′ ∈ Hist(W ′). So we have two histories
h′, h′′ ∈ Hist(W ′) for which h′ ⊆ h′′, whence, by Fact 1(3), h′ = h′′. This
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means that we have found some h ∈ Hist(W ) for which Λ(h) = h′. For
uniqueness of h, let h1, h2 ∈ Hist(W ) be such that Λ(h1) = Λ(h2) = h′.
Then h1 = f(h′) and h2 = f(h′), establishing h1 = h2.
Lemma 7. Let 〈W, <〉 be a BSTNF structure. Then its Λ-transform,
〈W ′, <′〉 =df Λ(〈W, <〉), is a common BST structure.
Proof. Our task is to show that 〈W ′, <′〉 satisfies the postulates of Defini-
tion 2.
1. Non-emptiness: By Fact 19(1).
2. Partial odering: By Fact 19(2).
3. No maximal nor minimal elements: By Fact 19(3).
4. <′ is dense.
Let ë1 <′ ë2, so by Fact 18(2), there is a unique e1 ∈ ë1 for which e1 <′ ë2.
Let e2 ∈ ë2; in particular, e1 < e2. By density of <, we have e∗ ∈ W
s.t. e1 < e∗ < e2. By the definition of the <′ ordering, this establishes
ë1 = Λ(e1) <′ Λ(e∗) <′ Λ(e2) = ë2, which proves density of <′.
5. Lower bounded chains have infima in <′.
Let t′ ⊆ W ′ be a lower bounded chain, and let b̈ ∈ W ′ be a lower bound
for t′. The elements of t′ are of the form ë = Λ(e) with e ∈ W . We
distinguish two cases. (a) If t′ has a least element (which covers the case
that t′ has only one element), then that least element is the infimum of
t′ w.r.t. <′, by definition. (b) If t′ has no least element, pick some ë ∈ t′,
and let t∗ =df {x ∈ t′ | x <′ ë}. We have inf t∗ = inf t′ by the definition of
the infimum. And by Fact 18(2), for all ë1 ∈ t∗ there are unique e1 ∈ W
for which e1 ∈ ë1 and e1 < ë, and there is a unique b∗ ∈ b̈ for which
b∗ < ë. So there is a unique set t ⊆ W given by
t = {e1 ∈ W | e1 < ë ∧ ë1 ∈ t∗},
which is a chain since t∗ is a chain; further t is lower bounded by b∗ ∈ W .
By the properties of BSTNF, t therefore has an infimum a =df inf t,
a ∈ W . We claim that ä is the infimum of t′ w.r.t. <′. As a < t, we have
ä <′ t′ by the definition of <′. Now let c̈ ′ t′. Again by Fact 18(2), there
is a unique c ∈ c̈ for which c < ë. By the fact that a is the infimum of
t, we have c  a, which implies c̈ ′ ä. So ä is indeed the greatest lower
bound, i.e., the infimum, of t′.
6. Upper bounded chains have history-relative suprema in <′.
Let t′ be an upper bounded chain with b̈ an upper bound, and let b̈ ∈ h′
for h′ some history in 〈W ′, <′〉, so that t′ ⊆ h′ as well. As h′ has a unique
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pre-image h under Λ (by Lemma 6), also b̈ and t′ have unique pre-images
b ∈ h and t ⊆ h. So by the BSTNF axioms, t has an h-relative supremum
s ∈ h. By Fact 17(1), we have t′ ′ s̈, and for any ä ∈ h′ for which
t′ ′ ä, we can consider the unique pre-image a ∈ h ∩ ä, for which t  a.
By the fact that s is the h-relative supremum of t, we have s  a, which
translates into s̈ ′ ä, i.e., s̈ is the least upper bound in h′, and therefore
the h′-relative supremum, of t′.
7. The Weiner postulate.
Consider two histories h′1, h
′
2 ∈ Hist(W ′), two chains l′, k′ ⊆ h′1 ∩ h′2, and
their history-relative suprema s̈i = suph′i l
′ and c̈i = suph′ik (i = 1, 2).
Assume that s̈1 ′ c̈1. We denote the unique pre-images of h′1, h′2, l′, k′, s̈1,
s̈2, c̈1, and c̈2 under Λ by h1, h2, l, k, s1, s2, c1, and c2, respectively. By
the uniqueness of pre-images and properties of <′, we have l, k ⊆ h1∩h2,
si = suphi(l), ci = suphi(k) (i = 1, 2), and s1  c1. Then by the Weiner
Postulate of BSTNF, s2  c2. Since s̈2 = Λ(s2) and c̈2 = Λ(c2), we have
s̈2 ′ c̈2.
8. Historical connection. Pick h′1, h
′
2 histories in 〈W ′, <′〉, and consider their
unique pre-images h1, h2 by Λ, which by Lemma 6 are histories in the
BSTNF structure 〈W, <〉. By historical connection for BSTNF structures,
we have h1 ∩ h2 = ∅. Hence Λ(h1) ∩ Λ(h2) = ∅, i.e., h′1 ∩ h′2 = ∅.
Lemma 8. The Λ-transform 〈W, <〉 =df Λ(〈W, <〉) of a BSTNF structure
〈W, <〉 satisfies the BST92 prior choice principle.
Proof. Let h′1, h
′
2 be histories in 〈W ′, <′〉, and let t′ ⊆ h′1 \ h′2 be a lower
bounded chain in h′1 that contains no element of h
′
2. We have to find a
maximal element c ∈ h′1 ∩ h′2 that lies below t′, c <′ t′, and for which
h′1 ⊥c h′2. The histories h′1, h′2 have as unique pre-images the 〈W, <〉-histories
h1, h2. As t′ ⊆ h′1, the unique pre-image t ⊆ h1. Furthermore, t∩h2 = ∅, for
an element e ∈ t∩h2 would give rise to ë ∈ t′ ∩h′2, violating our assumption
about t′. So t ⊆ h1 \ h2. From the BSTNF prior choice principle, we have a
choice set s̈ and s1 ∈ h1 ∩ s̈ for which s1  t, while there is some s2 ∈ s̈∩h2.
Let c =df Λ(s1) = s̈; we claim that c is the sought-for choice point. (a) By
Lemma 4 we have s̈1 = s̈2, and as si ∈ hi, we have s̈i ∈ h′i (i = 1, 2), so
that c = s̈1 = s̈2 ∈ h′1 ∩ h′2. (b) As c lies in the intersection of h′1 and h′2,
it cannot be that s̈1 ∈ t′. This excludes s1 ∈ t, so that in fact s1 < t. This
in turn implies c = s̈1 <′ t′. (c) For the maximality of c in h′1 ∩ h′2, assume
that there is ä ∈ h′1 ∩ h′2 for which c < ä. Then we have a unique pre-image
a1 ∈ h1 ∩ h2 for which both s1 < a1 and s2 < a1, so that both s1 and s2
belong to history h1. This contradicts Fact 9(1). So c = s̈ is in fact maximal
in h′1 ∩ h′2. (d) By the definition of ⊥c, we therefore have h′1 ⊥c h′2.
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Theorem 5. The Λ-transform Λ(〈W, <〉) of a BSTNF structure 〈W, <〉 is
a BST92 structure.
Proof. By Lemma 7 and Lemma 8.
5.2. Going Full Circle
We have now established that there is a way to get from BST92 structures
to BSTNF structures and from BSTNF structures to BST92 structures. This
raises the question of where we land when we concatenate these transforma-
tions. We can show that, as hoped, we land where we started: the resulting
structures are order-isomorphic to the ones we started with. Since all im-
portant notions of BST are defined in terms of the ordering, this means that
in the relevant sense, the Λ transform of the Υ transform of a BST92 struc-
ture is that original BST92 structure (Theorem 6), and the Υ transform
of the Λ transform of a BSTNF structure is that original BSTNF structure
(Theorem 7).
5.2.1. From BST92 to BSTNF to BST92
Theorem 6. The function Λ ◦ Υ is an order isomorphism of BST92 struc-
tures: Let 〈W1, <1〉 be a BST92 structure, let 〈W2, <2〉 =df Υ(〈W1, <1〉),
and let 〈W3, <3〉 =df Λ(〈W2, <2〉). Then there is an order isomorphism ϕ
between 〈W1, <1〉 and 〈W3, <3〉, i.e., a bijection between W1 and W3 that
preserves the ordering.
Proof. We claim that we can use the mapping ϕ, defined for e ∈ W1 to
be
ϕ(e) =df {e  H | H ∈ Πe}.
We have to show (1) that ϕ is indeed a mapping from W1 to W3, (2) that
ϕ is injective, (3) that ϕ is surjective, and (4) that ϕ preserves the ordering.
(1) Mapping: We have to show that for any e ∈ W1, ϕ(e) = {e  H |
H ∈ Πe} ∈ W3. The set W2 is the full transition structure of 〈W1, <1〉, so
that for e ∈ W1 and for any H ∈ Πe, the transition e  H ∈ W2. Thus,
for e ∈ W1, the set ϕ(e) ⊆ W2. The set W3 contains, for any τ ∈ W2, the
set Λ(τ) = τ̈ ∈ W3, and τ̈ ⊆ W2 as well. Let now e ∈ W1, and pick some
H∗ ∈ Πe,which fixes some τ = e  H∗ ∈ W2. We claim that
τ̈ = {e  H | H ∈ Πe},
which establishes τ̈ = ϕ(e), so that indeed, ϕ(e) ∈ W3. The claim is an
equality between subsets of W2, so that we show inclusion both ways.
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“⊆”: Let τ ′ = e′  H ′ ∈ τ̈ ; we have to show that τ ′ ∈ {e  H | H ∈
Πe}. We have τ ∈ h and τ ′ ∈ h′ for h, h′ ∈ Hist(W2). By Lemma 1 we know
that these histories are of the form
h = {e1  Πe1〈h1〉 | e1 ∈ h1}; h′ = {e′1  Πe′1〈h′1〉 | e′1 ∈ h′1}
for some h1, h′1 ∈ Hist(W1). The set τ̈ is defined as the intersection of all sets
of history-relative suprema of any chain l ⊆ W2 ending in, but not containing
τ (l ∈ Cτ ), so that for any l ∈ Cτ , we have suph l = τ and suph′ l = τ ′, since
τ ′ ∈ τ̈ . As τ = e  H∗ ∈ h, we have e ∈ h1. We now claim that e ∈ h′1 as
well. Assume otherwise, so that e ∈ h1 \ h′1. By PCP92, there is then some
c <1 e for which h1 ⊥c h′1. Let τc =df c  Πc〈h1〉, so that τc ∈ h and
τc <2 τ . There is thus some chain l ∈ Cτ for which τc ∈ l. As suph′ l = τ ′
(by τ ′ ∈ τ̈ , see above), we have l ⊆ h′, which implies τc ∈ h′ and c ∈ h′1.
From the form of elements of h′ we therefore must have Πc〈h1〉 = Πc〈h′1〉,
contradicting h1 ⊥c h′1. So indeed e ∈ h1 ∩ h′1.
Now take some l ∈ Cτ ; we have l ⊆ W2 and indeed l ⊆ h ∩ h′. Let l1
be the set of initials of the elements of l, i.e., l1 ⊆ W1 and l = {e1 
Πe1〈h1〉 | e1 ∈ l1}. Note that suph1 l1 = e = suph′1 l1 from suph l = τ and
e ∈ h1 ∩ h′1, and as l ⊆ h ∩ h′, we have Πe1〈h1〉 = Πe1〈h′1〉 for all e1 ∈ l1.
We now claim that suph′ l = τ ′′ =df e  Πe〈h′1〉. We have τ ′′ ∈ h′ because
e ∈ h′1, and l <2 τ ′′ because l1 <1 e, so τ ′′ is an upper bound of l in h′. Let
now τ∗ = e∗  Πe∗〈h′1〉 ∈ h′ be some upper bound of l in h′. Then e∗ is an
upper bound of l1 in h′1, and thus e 1 e∗ as suph′1 l1 = e, so that τ
′′ 2 τ∗,
proving that τ ′′ is the h′-relative supremum of l. So we have shown that
τ ′′ = e  Πe〈h′1〉 = suph′ l = τ ′. So indeed, τ ′ ∈ {e  H | H ∈ Πe}.
“⊇”: Let τ ′ ∈ {e  H | H ∈ Πe}, i.e., τ ′ = e  H for the e in question
and for some H ∈ Πe. We have to show that τ ′ ∈ τ̈ . We have τ ∈ h and
τ ′ ∈ h′ for some h, h′ ∈ Hist(W2), which are again of the form
h = {e1  Πe1〈h1〉 | e1 ∈ h1}; h′ = {e′1  Πe′1〈h′1〉 | e′1 ∈ h′1}
for some h1, h′1 ∈ Hist(W1), so that τ ′ = e  Πe〈h′1〉.
Let l ∈ Cτ ; we have suph l = τ = e  H∗ by assumption. We now claim
that suph′ l = τ ′, which establishes τ ′ ∈ τ̈ . To prove that τ ′ is the h′-relative
supremum of l, as above, let l1 be the set of initials of the elements l, so that
l1 ⊆ W1 and l = {e1  Πe1〈h1〉 | e1 ∈ l1}. Again as above, l1 <1 e, and thus
τ ′ is an upper bound of l in h′. Let now τ∗ = e∗  Πe∗〈h′1〉 ∈ h′ be some
upper bound of l in h′. Then e∗ ∈ h′1 is an upper bound of l1 in h′1, and thus
e 1 e∗ as suph′1 l1 = e (note that e ∈ h′1 as τ ′ ∈ h′). Therefore τ ′ 2 τ∗,
proving that τ ′ is the h′-relative supremum of l. As l was an arbitrary chain
from Cτ , we have indeed τ ′ ∈ τ̈ .
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(2) Injectivity: Let e, e′ ∈ W1 with e = e′. Then ϕ(e) = ϕ(e′). This is
clear as the sets ϕ(e) and ϕ(e′) have different members.
(3) Surjectivity: Let a ∈ W3. We have to find some e ∈ W1 for which
ϕ(e) = a. As a ∈ W3, we have a = τ̈ for some τ = e  H ∈ W2, where
e ∈ W1 and H ∈ Πe. Above under (1) we have established that for τ = e 
H ∈ W2, we have τ̈ = {e  H | H ∈ Πe}, i.e., a = τ̈ = ϕ(e).
(4) Order preservation: We have to show that for e1, e2 ∈ W1, e1 <1 e2
iff ϕ(e1) <3 ϕ(e2). (The claim about equality follows from the fact that ϕ is
a bijection.) We know from the definition of ϕ that ϕ(ei) = {ei  H | H ∈
Πei} (i = 1, 2).
“⇒”: Let e1, e2 ∈ W1 with e1 <1 e2, and let h2 ∈ He2 . Let τ1 =df e1 
Πe1〈h2〉 and τ2 =df e2  H for some H ∈ Πe2 ; we have τ1, τ2 ∈ W2 and
ϕ(ei) = τ̈i (i = 1, 2). By the definition of the transition ordering <2, we have
τ1 <2 τ2, and by the definition of <3 in terms of instances, we thus have
τ̈1 <3 τ̈2, i.e., ϕ(e1) <3 ϕ(e2).
“⇐”: Let ϕ(e1) <3 ϕ(e2), i.e., there are some τ1 ∈ ϕ(e1), τ2 ∈ ϕ(e2) for
which τ1 <2 τ2. These transitions have the form τi = ei  Hi for some
ei ∈ W1 and Hi ∈ Πei (i = 1, 2). Thus, in particular, from τ1 <2 τ2 we have
that e1 <1 e2.
5.2.2. From BSTNF to BST92 to BSTNF Before we can tackle the main
Theorem 7, we need to establish an additional fact.
Fact 20. Let 〈W1, <1〉 be a BSTNF structure and 〈W2, <2〉=df Λ(〈W1, <1〉)
the corresponding BST92 structure. Then for any h1, h2 ∈ Hist(W1), we have
h1 ⊥1ë h2 iff Λ(h1) ⊥2ë Λ(h2), where ⊥ië is the relation of splitting for histories
in Wi.
Proof. “⇒”: Let h1, h2 ∈ Hist(W1), and let h1 ⊥1ë h2. Then there are
e1, e2 ∈ ë s.t. e1 = e2 and hi ∩ ë = ei (i = 1, 2). Then Λ(e1) = Λ(e2) = ë,
so ë ∈ Λ(h1) ∩ Λ(h2). Moreover, ë is maximal in Λ(h1) ∩ Λ(h2), which
establishes Λ(h1) ⊥2ë Λ(h2). To prove this, assume for reductio that there is
some ë′ >2 ë in the intersection of Λ(h1) and Λ(h2). This means that there
are some e′1, e
′
2 ∈ ë′ with e′1 ∈ h1, e′2 ∈ h2, and Λ(e′1) = Λ(e′2) = ë′. The
ordering ë <2 ë′ implies that for some e∗ ∈ ë, e∗ <2 ë1, which further implies
that e∗ <1 e′1 and e
∗ <1 e′2. But then e
∗ ∈ h1 ∩ h2, and by Fact 18(2), it
must be that e∗ = e1 = e2, which contradicts h1 ⊥1ë h2.
“⇐”: Let Λ(h1) ⊥2ë Λ(h2), which implies that ë ∈ Λ(h1) ∩ Λ(h2). Note
that there are ei s.t. ei ∈ hi and Λ(ei) = ë (i = 1, 2). Therefore, hi ∩ ë = ∅,
so that h1 and h2 fulfill the precondition for either h1 ≡1ë h2 or h1 ⊥1ë h2 (see
Definition 17). For reductio, assume the former, which means that h1 ∩ ë =
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h2 ∩ ë, i.e., e1 = e2. As there are no maxima in the intersection of histories
in BSTNF (Fact 12), there is some e∗ ∈ h1 ∩ h2 for which e1 <1 e∗. Now
for ë∗ =df Λ(e∗) we have ë∗ ∈ Λ(h1) ∩ Λ(h2), and ë <2 ë∗. This, however,
contradicts the maximality of ë implied by Λ(h1) ⊥2ë Λ(h2). So in fact, we
have h1 ⊥1ë h2.
Note that by contraposing the above Fact (and making a simple observa-
tion) we have that for any h1, h2 ∈ Hist(W1), h1 ≡1ë h2 iff Λ(h1) ≡2ë Λ(h2).
Theorem 7. The function Υ ◦Λ is an order isomorphism of BSTNF struc-
tures: Let 〈W1, <1〉 be a BSTNF structure, let 〈W2, <2〉 =df Λ(〈W1, <1〉),
and let 〈W3, <3〉 =df Υ(〈W2, <2〉). Then there is an order isomorphism ϕ
between 〈W1, <1〉 and 〈W3, <3〉, i.e., a bijection between W1 and W3 that
preserves the ordering.
Proof. We claim that we can use the mapping ϕ, defined for e ∈ W1 to
be
ϕ(e) =df ë  Πë〈Λ(h)〉 for arbitrary h ∈ He ⊆ Hist1.
First we show that ϕ(e) is well-defined. Thus, let h, h′ ∈ He; we need to
show that Πë〈Λ(h)〉 = Πë〈Λ(h′)〉. By Lemma 6 (1), Λ(h), Λ(h′) ∈ Hist(W2).
Also, by Fact 12, h ≡ë h′, and so by Fact 20, Πë〈Λ(h)〉 = Πë〈Λ(h′)〉.
We now have to show (1) that ϕ is indeed a mapping from W1 to W3,
(2) that ϕ is injective, (3) that ϕ is surjective, and (4) that ϕ preserves the
ordering.
(1) Mapping: We have to show that for any e ∈ W1, ϕ(e) = ë 
Πë〈Λ(h)〉 ∈ W3, where h ∈ He ⊆ Hist1. The set W3 is defined via W2,
and the set W2 = Λ[W1], which means that for every e ∈ W1, ë ∈ W2. To ë
is then assigned Πë〈Λ(h)〉, and we need to see if it is an elementary outcome
of ë, i.e., an element of Πë. Since by Lemma 6 Λ(h) is a history in 〈W2, <2〉
for any h ∈ Hist1 and for any h ∈ He, ë = Λ(e) ∈ Λ(h), we get that Πë〈Λ(h)〉
is an elementary outcome of ë, so indeed ë  Πë〈Λ(h)〉 ∈ W3.
(2) Injectivity: Let e, e′ ∈ W1 and e = e′. If ë = ë′, then obviously
ϕ(e) = ϕ(e′), as these two transitions then have different initials. If ë = ë′
but e = e′, then e and e′ are incompatible elements of the choice set ë, and
moreover, for any h, h′ ∈ Hist1, if e ∈ h, e′ ∈ h′, then h ⊥ë h′, and hence
by Fact 20, Λ(h) ⊥ë Λ(h′). Accordingly, Πë〈Λ(h)〉 = Πë〈Λ(h′)〉, and hence
ϕ(e) = ϕ(e′).
(3) Surjectivity: Let a ∈ W3. We have to find some e ∈ W1 for which
ϕ(e) = a. As a ∈ W3, we have a = ë′  H, where ë′ ∈ W2 and H ∈ Πë′ .
Since 〈W2, <2〉 is the result of Λ-transform applied to 〈W1, <1〉, there is
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(possibly more than one) e∗ ∈ W1 for which Λ(e∗) = ë′. We need to find
which of these is the sought-for e. Clearly, there is some h∗ ∈ Hist(W2) for
which H = Πë′〈h∗〉. By Lemma 6(2), there is a unique h ∈ Hist(W1) s.t.
h∗ = Λ(h), and hence H = Πë′〈Λ(h)〉. For the sought-for e we thus take
the unique e ∈ ë′ ∩ h; clearly ë′ = ë. It follows that ϕ(e) = ë  H, where
H = Πë〈Λ(h)〉.
(4) Order preservation: For e1, e2 ∈ W1, e1 <1 e2 iff ϕ(e1) <3 ϕ(e2). (The
claim about equality already follows from the fact that ϕ is a bijection.)
“⇒”: Let e1, e2 ∈ W1 with e1 <1 e2. We show that ϕ(e1) <3 ϕ(e2). Since
for ϕ(e1) we may pick an arbitrary member of He1 , we pick h2 ∈ He2 ⊆
He1 , so that e1, e2 ∈ h2. We get, as required, ë1 <2 ë2 and hence, as the
elementary outcomes ϕ(ei) are defined by the same history Λ(h2), we get
Hë2 ⊆ Πë1〈Λ(h2)〉. Hence, ë1  Πë1〈Λ(h2)〉 <3 ë2  Πë2〈Λ(h2)〉.
“⇐”: Let ϕ(e1) <3 ϕ(e2), i.e., (ë1  Πë1〈Λ(h1)〉 <3 (ë2  Πë2〈Λ(h2)〉),
for hi ∈ Hei , ei ∈ ëi. Hence for some e′1 ∈ ë1: (i) e′1 <2 ë2, and hence
Hë2 ⊆ He′1 , so h2 ∈ He′1 (because He2 ⊆ Hë2 ). Since h2 ∈ He2 ⊆ He1 , and
it is impossible that {e1, e′1} ⊆ h2 (by Fact 9(1)), it must be that e1 = e′1
and hence e1 < e2 (by (i)).
6. Conclusion
In this paper we developed a branching space-times theory that constitutes
an alternative to the well-studied theory of Belnap [1], BST92. We describe
both BST92 and our “new foundations” theory, BSTNF, as alternative ver-
sions of common BST structures (Definition 2). The difference lies in the
way in which histories branch locally, as prescribed by the different prior
choice principles, PCP92 (Definition 6) vs. PCPNF (Definition 18). On the
one hand, the difference between BST92 and BSTNF is substantial, as shown
by their different topological properties: in BSTNF, locally Euclidean indi-
vidual histories give rise to a locally Euclidean branching structure, i.e., to
a generalized manifold, whereas in BST92, local Euclidicity does not carry
over from individual histories to the whole branching structure. On the other
hand, we can prove that both frameworks are formally intertranslatable,
so that BST92 and BSTNF can be viewed as different possible representa-
tions of a single underlying notion of local indeterminism. In this way, the
development of BSTNF strengthens the position that branching space-times
provides an adequate, formally precise analysis of local indeterminism.
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